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Abstract
In this paper we present the argument-based model ProCLAIM, in-
tended to provide a setting for heterogeneous agents to deliberate over
safety critical actions. To achieve this purpose ProCLAIM features a Me-
diator Agent with three main tasks: 1) guiding the participating agents
in what their valid dialectical moves are at each stage of the dialogue; 2)
deciding whether submitted arguments should be accepted on the basis of
their relevance; and finally, 3) evaluating the accepted arguments in order
to provide an assessment of whether the proposed action should or should
not be undertaken. The main focus in this paper is the proposal of a set of
reasoning patters, represented in terms of argument schemes and critical
questions, intended to automatise deliberations on whether a proposed
action can safely be performed. Framed within the ProCLAIM model, we
we aim to motivate the importance of these schemes and critical questions
for: a) the Mediator Agent’s guiding task that allows for a highly focused
deliberation; b) the effective participation of heterogeneous agents; and c)
enabling the reuse of previous similar deliberations in order to evaluate
arguments on an evidential basis.
1 Introduction
Safety critical actions such as transplanting an organ to a particular patient or
to spill an industrial wastewater discharge require an extra obligation to ensure
that no undesirable side effects will be caused, as these side effects may well be
the death of the patient or a severe impact on the eﬄuvial ecosystem. To min-
imise harm, the choice of safety-critical actions is usually governed by guidelines
and regulations that direct decision makers on what to do. However, strict ad-
herence to such domain consented knowledge may not always be convenient. For
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instance, in the transplant domain, strict adherence to conventional guidelines,
regarding the criteria for donor and organ eligibility for transplantation, results
in a progressive undersupply of available organs with the result of significantly
extended waiting times and increased mortality of those on waiting lists [29].
Domains such as organ transplantation or wastewater management are highly
complex and rapidly evolve; thus common consented knowledge cannot always
be expected to be up to date and account for all possible circumstances1. Hence,
decision makers that are experts in these domains, should be allowed to deviate
from guidelines, in so far as their decisions are well justified and supported by
empirical evidence.
Furthermore, some safety-critical actions require the participation of several
agents – experts in different aspects of the problem – for deciding whether or not
their performance is safe. For example, an organ available for transplantation
is better judged as suitable or not for a given recipient, if experts at the donor
site jointly take a decision with the experts at the recipient site, which may be
located in a different hospital [27]. Despite the added value of joint decision
making among experts, this requirement cannot always be met. Without the
appropriate support, the deliberation among experts on whether a proposed
action is safe or not is time consuming and has no guarantee of a successful
outcome. Thus, any decision support systems intended to assist experts in de-
ciding whether a safety-critical action can be performed without causing severe
undesirable side effects, must take into account that:
• Decisions on whether or not to perform a safety-critical action should be
well justified.
• Guidelines and regulations are important, but strict adherence to them
does not always warrant safety or determine the best decision.
• Empirical evidence plays an important role in safety-critical decision mak-
ing.
• Decision makers may be experts in the domain. While their decision
should be subjected to guidelines, they should be able to deviate from
conventional guidelines in some special circumstances.
• Several experts may be required to participate in the deliberation on
whether the proposed action is safe or not. Not only because they may
have complementary knowledge about the problem at hand, but also be-
cause they may represent potentially-diverse interests. In this situation
one should take into account that:
– Decision makers may be in disagreement about whether the action
can safely be performed or not.
1For example, Transplant organisations periodically publish the consented organ accept-
ability criteria. However, these criteria rapidly evolve because of the researchers’ effort in
extending them to reduce organ discards. Hence, the more advanced transplant professionals
deviate from consented criteria.
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– Decision makers, especially human experts, may not be able to main-
tain long intensive deliberations.
– Participant agents are expected to be heterogeneous. Some agents
may be humans while others may be artificial. Furthermore, artificial
agents may well be diverse in their implementation given that differ-
ent agents may be implemented by different developers. In general,
in such a setting, a uniform underlying logic cannot be assumed for
all participants [36]. It should be noted that by heterogeneous agents
we do not imply the deliberation occurs in an open environment.
Quite the opposite, we expect a highly regulated environment.
In this paper we present an argumentation-based model called ProCLAIM that
provides a principled way for addressing the above introduced problem. Pro-
CLAIM is therefore proposed as a model intended to support experts in a collab-
orative decision as to whether or not a safety-critical action can be performed.
Central to this model is the definitions of policies for the agents’ overall inter-
action, where policies define what can be argued about and how, at each stage
of the deliberation. The main purpose and contribution of this paper is the
proposal of an argumentation process, based on argument schemes and critical
questions, intended to drive the deliberation over safety-critical action among
human and artificial agents in a manner which is structured and orderly, and
which elicits all the information needed to make such decisions jointly and ratio-
nally, even when this information is possessed only by some of the participating
agents. A second contribution is that participants in the dialogue need not have
any specialised knowledge of argumentation theory, because the framework em-
beds domain expertise (e.g. medical or environmental) in a natural way using
application-specific reasoning patterns.
The work presented in this paper builds on and substantially extends works
in a number of earlier papers. The key ideas were sketched out in [55], and
proposed in the context of a medical agent-based organisation (CARREL) [58]
intended to facilitate the offer and allocation of human organs for transplan-
tation. In [56] we proposed the use of scenario specific argument schemes and
critical question, tailored for medical applications, to define a protocol-based
exchange of arguments which models the agents’ deliberation. In [57] we intro-
duced the ProCLAIM model and focused on the role of a Case-Based Reasoning
component. In [54] we presented a mature version of the above mentioned med-
ical application, and in [53] we described its prototype implementation as the
main large scale demonstrator system of the FP6 European project ASPIC2.
Subsequent work focused on generalising ProCLAIM so as to be applicable to
domains other than the medical. Key to this was the generalisation of [56]’s
scenario-specific schemes and critical questions, sketched in [51], and used in
the application of ProCLAIM to the environmental domain [52].
In the following subsections we introduce the theoretical context of this work.
In §1.1 we introduce some basic concepts in argumentation, particularly focusing
2http://www.argumentation.org/carrel.htm
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on the use of argument schemes and critical questions as a means to define the
argument-based interaction among agents. In §1.2 we briefly describe Walton
and Krabbe’s influential characterisation of the different types of dialogues,
where we focus on the deliberation dialogues and their collaborative nature. In
§1.3 we introduce the notion of dialogue games, used to define agents’ interaction
in a dialogue. We conclude this introductory section presenting this paper’s
organisation.
1.1 Argumentation and Argument Schemes
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the use of argumentation
techniques for defeasible (non-monotonic) reasoning and conflict resolution in
automated systems [44, 8, 43]. Requirements for these modes of reasoning arise
when information is incomplete or uncertain, and when different agent perspec-
tives yield choices that may rationally be acceptable to one agent but not to
another. In such situations argumentation techniques define the construction of
arguments (supporting reasons) for possibly conflicting conclusions. Such argu-
ments are constructed on the basis of underlying knowledge bases or theories.
Then, based on the conflict based relations between the constructed arguments,
those that are ‘winning’ or‘ justified’ are evaluated, where the claims of the
latter identify the inferences from the underlying theories.
To model the process of argumentation in automated reasoning systems,
requires methods that enable our reasoning agents to both generate arguments
and proposals about what to believe and what to do, and methods to enable
reasoning agents to assess the relative worth of the arguments pertinent to a
particular debate, i.e., which arguments are the most convincing and why. Here
we set out the main mechanisms that we will use for these purposes: argument
schemes and argumentation frameworks.
Argument schemes were introduced in the informal logic literature as a
method for argument representation. In particular, the association of schemes
with critical questions (CQ) that enable systematic identification of how to at-
tack arguments instantiating schemes, was pioneered by Walton [60]. Argument
schemes represent stereotypical patterns of reasoning whereby the scheme con-
tains premises that presumptively licence a conclusion. The presumptions need
to stand in the context in which the argument is deployed, so they can be chal-
lenged by posing the appropriate critical questions associated with the scheme.
In order for the presumptions to stand, satisfactory answers must be given to
any such questions that are posed in the given situation.
Argument schemes and CQ have been applied in a wide variety of works in
AI. Of particular relevance to the work in this paper, is the use of argument
schemes and CQ for the definition of a persuasion dialogue game for reasoning
about action proposals [4]. Computational accounts of the schemes and CQ
approach to argumentation over action have a number of advantages. The
schemes and CQ effectively map out the relevant space of argumentation, in
the sense that for any argument they identify the valid attacking arguments
from amongst those that are logically possible. They also provide a natural
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basis for structuring argumentation based dialogue protocols. This later work
is used as a starting point for defining ProCLAIM’s protocol-based exchange of
arguments. This is discussed in §5 where we present a structured set of schemes
and CQ tailored for deliberating over safety critical actions.
Whilst argument schemes provide us with a means to generate arguments
and question them, we also need a mechanism that will enable us to automati-
cally evaluate the arguments and challenges generated in order to determine the
ones that are acceptable. For this we make use of Dung’s abstract argumenta-
tion theory [16]. This theory has proven to be an influential approach to conflict
resolution and non-monotonic reasoning over the past decade. The underlying
idea is that one is given a directed graph –a so called abstract argumentation
framework (AF)- consisting of abstract arguments (i.e., no commitment is made
to their internal structure) related by a binary attack or defeat relation. The
justified status of arguments is then evaluated based on their interactions. This
evaluation is in turn based on the notion of an argument being acceptable with
respect to a set of arguments if it is not attacked by a member of that set, and
all its attackers are attacked by a member of that set.
Numerous subsequent works ([2],[7], [34]) have extended the basic framework
so that an attack from an argument A to an argument B can be disregarded
if B is for some reason stronger than or preferred to A. Then, the justified
arguments are evaluated based only on the successful attacks (that are usually
referred to as defeats). This allows us for example to resolve local disputes
between mutually (symmetrically) attacking arguments, so that if A attacks B
and B attacks A, then a relative preference over these arguments will determine
that one asymmetrically defeats the other.
Here we recall the following basic concepts that were introduced by Dung in
[16]:
An Argumentation Framework (AF ) is a pair AF = <AR, Attack>, where
AR is a set of arguments and Attack ⊆ AR × AR is the attack relationship for
AF. A pair <x,y> is referred to as “x attacks (or is an attacker of) y” or “y is
attacked by x”. For R, S, subsets of AR, we say that:
• s ∈ S is attacked by R if there is some r ∈ R such that <r,s> ∈ A.
• x ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to S if for every y ∈ AR that attacks x,
there is some z ∈ S that attacks y (i.e. z, and hence S, defends x against
y).
• S is conflict free if no argument in S is attacked by any other argument
in S.
• A conflict free set is admissible if every argument in S is acceptable with
respect to S.
• S is a complete extension if S is a subset of AR, S is admissible, and each
argument which is defended by S is in S.
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• S is a grounded extension if it is the least (with respect to set inclusion)
complete extension.3
As stated above, such frameworks can be depicted as argument graphs. In
section §2 we demonstrate how, for our particular application, the interacting
arguments define a tree, and how we use such trees to evaluate arguments and
attacks generated by our system, and thus ultimately decide on whether or
not an action should be performed. From hereon, when we say an argument
is justified we assume it is under the grounded semantics. One advantage of
the grounded semantics is that computing its extension is a linear problem and
that the extension always exists, though it may be empty. For this reason the
grounded semantics has been argued to be too skeptical. While skepticism may
yield well for reasoning over safety-critical actions it may be too restrictive for
other applications [17].
Let us suppose < AR,Attack > is an argumentation framework and G the
grounded extension. Then, if x ∈ AR:
• x is said to be justified if x ∈ G.
• x is defeated if there exist an argument y ∈ G such that (y, x) ∈ Attack.
• Otherwise, x is said to be defensible.
Now, if the argument proposing the safety critical action is evaluated as
justified, the action is recommended as safe. If evaluated as defeated, the ac-
tion is deemed unsafe. Otherwise, no conclusive recommendation can be given.
However, as we discuss in §7, a ProCLAIM proposed solution will highlights the
relevant issues that must be resolved before taking the final decision.
The approaches to argument modelling described above form the basis for
some of the elements in our system that are used to generate and evaluate
arguments. However, we also need to specify how these models will be used
within the context of a dialogue, as discussed next.
1.2 Deliberation Dialogues
As defined by Walton and Krabbe in their influential classification of human
dialogues [61], deliberation dialogues involve participants deciding what action
or course of actions should be undertaken in a given situation. Typically par-
ticipants in such a dialogue believe that they share a responsibility for deciding
what to do, which provides a collaborative context to the dialogue. The Wal-
ton and Krabbe classification is based on the prior knowledge and goals of the
individual participants, and includes five other major types of dialogues. Thus,
in Information-Seeking Dialogues a questioner seeks to discover an answer
to a factual question from another participant, whom is believed by the ques-
tioner to know the answer to the question. In Inquiry Dialogues participants
3We refer the reader to [16] for definition of extensions defined under stable and preferred
semantics
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jointly seek to answer a factual question whose answer may not be known to
any of them beforehand, or may require sharing of the partial knowledge each
participant has. In Persuasion Dialogues, a participant, typically called the
proponent, seeks to persuade his or her fellow participant(s) to endorse some
proposition. Participants in a Negotiation Dialogue seek to agree a division
of a scarce resource (which may be the participants’ time) between potentially
conflicting claims over it. If participants each seek to maximise their share of the
resource, then their dialogue will require some form of bargaining or compromise
in order to reach an agreement. And finally, in Eristic Dialogues, participants
seek to vent perceived grievances with one another, and the dialogue may act
as a substitute for physical fighting. Negotiation and Deliberation Dialogues in-
volve discussions over actions, while Information-Seeking and Inquiry Dialogues
involve discussions over beliefs. Persuasion Dialogues may concern either beliefs
or actions.
In addition to this focus on action, all Deliberation Dialogues normally share
some other characteristic features. The first is the absence of any fixed positions
by the participants at the start of the dialogue. Unlike Persuasion Dialogues,
for example, participants in a Deliberation Dialogue do not (at least, initially),
seek to persuade another participant to endorse some statement or proposal for
action. Indeed, the focus, or governing question, may change in the course of
a Deliberation Dialogue, as participants explore the space of possible actions
and examine the features and consequences of these actions. During the course
of a Deliberation Dialogue, of course, participants may engage in a Persuasion
Dialogue (or indeed any one of the Walton and Krabbe types), which may moti-
vate to model such a Persuasion Dialogue as embedded inside the Deliberation
Dialogue. A second important feature of a Deliberation Dialogue is the mutual
focus, which distinguishes these dialogues from, say, Negotiation Dialogues. Par-
ticipants in a Deliberation Dialogue do not necessarily seek to agree a course
of action which accommodates or reconciles their various different interests. It
may be that the participants do in fact aim to do this, and it may even be that
they succeed in doing so, but these aspects are not essential features of a Delib-
eration Dialogue. Although in a Deliberation Dialogue, participants exchange
proposals and express their positions about what is to be done, their shared goal
is to jointly reach agreement on the best or most sensible action to decide to
do (in these circumstances, at this time, by the designated actors, under these
constraints), rather than to defend a particular position. For a fuller discussion
of the characteristic features of Deliberation Dialogues, see [31].
1.3 Dialogue Games
Dialogue games are interactions between two or more participants who ‘move’
by uttering locutions, according to certain rules. They were first studied by
Aristotle [3] and then by argumentation theorists and logicians in the post-war
period (eg, [23, 28]). Over the last decade they have been applied in various ar-
eas of computer science and artificial intelligence, particularly for rule-governed
interactions between software agents; for a recent review of such applications,
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see [33]. A dialogue game may be specified by listing the legal locutions, to-
gether with the rules which govern the utterance of these locutions, the opening
and termination of dialogues, and the rules for manipulation of any dialogical
commitments incurred by the participants during a dialogue [32].
Our work is informed by the dialogue-game framework for ideal Deliber-
ation Dialogues proposed by McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons in [31]. In
that framework, deliberation dialogues may proceed through eight successive
stages: Open, Inform, Propose, Consider, Revise, Recommend, Confirm and
Close Stages. The goals of participants in these dialogues change according to
the stage of the dialogue. It is for this reason that stages are marked explicitly,
so as to better enable participants to know what is expected of them at each
stage. In this framework, there are some constraints on the order of the stages,
and some stages may be repeated, in an iterative fashion, before the dialogue is
completed. This approach is taken as a starting point for defining ProCLAIM’s
dialogue game which we introduce in §4.
1.4 Document Organisation
In the following section we introduce the ProCLAIM model. In §3 we intro-
duce one of our case studies – human organ transplantation – which will be
used throughout this paper to illustrate the agents’ interaction; particularly
the exchange of arguments. In §4 we present the model’s deliberation dialogue
game that will define the context for the agents’ overall interaction. In sec-
tion §5 we focus on the argumentation, we first define the internal structure of
ProCLAIM’s arguments in §5.1, to then in §5.2 introduce the model’s protocol-
based exchange of arguments based on schemes and CQs tailored for deliberating
over safety critical actions. In §6 we illustrate how the schemes can be further
specialised for a particular application and how these more specialised schemes
and CQ are used to guide agents in their deliberation facilitating the interac-
tion for both human and artificial agents. In §7 we briefly discuss the model’s
argument evaluation. In §8 we discuss how the defined argument schemes and
CQs facilitate the reuse of previous deliberations for evaluating arguments on
an evidential basis. Finally, we conclude in §9.
2 The ProCLAIM Model
The ProCLAIM model is intended to provide a setting for heterogeneous agents
to efficiently and effectively deliberate over whether a safety-critical action
can safely be performed.ProCLAIM can be regarded as defining a centralised
medium through which heterogeneous agent are directed in a deliberation over
the safety of a proposed action. This medium is tailored for the deliberation
purpose and is intended to focus the discussion on the relevant matters, while
keeping track of the participants’ submitted arguments and evaluating them to
propose a solution to the addressed problem. This centralised medium is em-
bodied by a Mediator Agent (MA) whose role is to ensure the success of the
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deliberation process, enabled by the MA’s access to a number of knowledge
resources, which we now introduce.
The setting ProCLAIM provides for participant agents to efficiently delib-
erate is best described by defining the mediator agent’s tasks:
• Direct participants on what argument-based moves (argument schemes
or critical questions) they can submit at each point of the deliberation.
Thus, for each argument a participant wants to reply to, she is given a
set of schemes that she can instantiate and submit as a valid attack, in so
far as the instantiation is appropriate. A participant may also challenge
some of the submitted arguments and, in turn, a participant may answer
to these challenges with the instantiation of the appropriate argument
scheme.
• Validate the incoming arguments in order to exclude arguments that
may jeopardise or disrupt the course of the deliberation. While agents are
given the schemes to instantiate, there is no guarantee that the instanti-
ation will be relevant for the discussion. Thus, one of MA’s tasks is to
discern between relevant and non-relevant instantiations, so as to keep the
deliberation highly focused on only the important matters. Each validated
argument and challenge is added to a tree of interacting arguments whose
root is the argument proposing the initial action.
• Submit additional arguments that introduce new factors not taken
into account by the participants but that either guidelines and/or evi-
dence associated with previous similar cases indicate as relevant. Thus,
for example, if α is taken as a fact, and guidelines indicate that α is a
contraindication for performing the proposed action, but, for some reason
no participant highlights this, the MA will submit an argument against
the action proposal indicating that there is a contraindication α for its
performance. This argument will be added to the tree of interacting ar-
guments.
• Evaluate the tree of interacting arguments so as to propose a solu-
tion to whether the proposed action is safe or not. A solution is proposed
by means of assigning a preference between conflicting (mutually attack-
ing) arguments and then evaluating the justified arguments as defined by
Dung’s theory.
In order to perform the above introduced tasks, the MA references four
knowledge resources, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 and also described
below:
Argument Scheme Repository (ASR): In order to direct the participant
agents in the submission and exchange of arguments, the MA references
a repository of argument schemes and their associated critical questions.
The schemes and critical questions are instantiated by agents to construct
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arguments, and effectively encode the full ‘space of argumentation’, i.e.,
all possible lines of reasoning that should be pursued w.r.t a given issue.
The repository is structured in such a way that it defines the protocol-
based exchange of arguments. Thus, given an argument (that instantiates
a scheme in ASR) the repository returns the schemes that agents can
instantiate in reply to the former argument (as well as the critical questions
used to challenge it).
Figure 1: ProCLAIM’s architecture.
Domain Consented Knowledge (DCK): This component enables the MA
to check
whether the arguments comply with the established knowledge, by check-
ing what the valid instantiations of the schemes in ASR are (the ASR
can thus be regarded as an abstraction of the DCK). This is of particular
importance in safety critical domains where 1) one is under extra obli-
gation to ensure that spurious instantiations of argument schemes should
not bear on the outcome of any deliberation; and 2) guidelines usually
exist in such domains and so should be taken into account when evaluat-
ing the submitted arguments. The MA also references the DCK in order
to check whether any known factor is not being addressed by the partic-
ipants (experts) in spite of being deemed relevant from the view point of
the guidelines. In such a case, the MA uses the DCK in order to submit
additional arguments, which account for these neglected, but relevant, fac-
tors. In this last sense, the MA can be regarded as a participant expert
in guidelines.
Case-Based Reasoning Component (CBRc): This component enables the
MA to assign a preference relation between mutually attacking arguments
(i.e. resolve conflicts amongst pairs of arguments) on the basis of their
associated evidence gathered from past deliberations. The CBRc also pro-
vides additional arguments that were deemed relevant in previous similar
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situations and are applicable in the current target problem. Again, in this
last sense, the MA plays the role of an expert, or specialist in collecting
evidence from previous deliberations.
Argument Endorsement Manager (AEM): Depending on who endorses
an argument, the strengths of arguments may be readjusted by the MA.
Thus, this component manages the knowledge related to, for example, the
agents’ roles and/or reputations.
Broadly speaking, a deliberation in ProCLAIM begins with one of the agents4
submitting an argument proposing an action (e.g. transplant an available organ
to a particular recipient). TheMA will then guide the participant agents in the
submission of further arguments that will attack or defend the justification given
for the proposed action. Each submitted argument (or challenge) instantiates
a scheme (or critical question) of the ASR. Hence the MA references the ASR
in order to indicate which are the schemes or critical questions the participants
can instantiate in reply to each of the submitted arguments or challenges.
Justified Argument Defensible ArgumentDefeated Argument
a) b) c)
A B Argument A attacks argument B
A3 preferred to A2 
A5 preferred to A4 
A3 preferred to A2











































Figure 2: Resolving a tree of interacting arguments in order to decide whether
or not to perform X. In figure a) no solution can be proposed since it is still un-
decided as to whether the respective solutions address the respective problems,
as indicate by the symmetric attacks between A2 and A3, and A4 and A5. In
figures b) and c) the solutions are, respectively, to perform action X and not to,
depending on the arguments’ preference assignment.
A submitted argument, if legal (instantiates an appropriate scheme), is eval-
uated by theMA in order to determine whether the instantiation of the scheme
is a valid one. This is done by the MA referencing the DCK, CBRc and AEM.
If an argument is compliant with guidelines, i.e. validated by the DCK, the
argument is accepted and added to the tree of interacting argument which we
4This agent may well be the MA if the action is a default one.
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denote as T. If the incoming argument is not validated by the DCK it may
still be accepted if either the CBRc indicates the argument has previously been
accepted or the AEM indicates that the submitter is sufficiently reliable so as
to exceptionably accept this argument. In either case the argument is added
to the tree of arguments T and the MA broadcasts this new argument to all
participants together with the schemes they can instantiate in reply. If the
argument is not accepted by the knowledge resources, the MA informs the sub-
mitter of the reasons for it being rejected. Other approaches have considered
the relevance of an argument in terms of its impact, or potential impact, on the
dialectical status of acceptability of the already posed arguments [40, 39, 30].
Broadly speaking, if an argument to submit will have little or no effect on the
acceptability status of the existing arguments, it may be deemed irrelevant and
so may not be submitted5. This approach to the relevance of an argument could
be used in ProCLAIM for example to stop the deliberation once it is clear that
there are enough arguments to deem the proposed action unsafe.
The agents’ interaction is described in §4 in terms of set of stages and in-
teraction layers. For instance, the exchange of arguments is defined within the
Argumentation Layer of the Deliberation Stage. As depicted in Figure 1, be-
sides the exchange of arguments, within the Deliberation Stage we define other
interaction layers, such as the Context Layer in which participants submit the
facts and complementary actions they believe to be potentially relevant for the
deliberation. At the Endorsement Layer, participants indicate which arguments
in T they endorse.
Once all participants have no more arguments to exchange, have submitted
all the facts they deem relevant and have informed of the arguments in T they
endorse, the deliberation moves into the Resolution Stage in which T is evalu-
ated. As depicted in figure 2a) T may contain arguments that mutually attack
each other preventing a definitive solution. Thus, to evaluate T MA has to
assign a preference relation between the mutually attacking arguments, and so
change the symmetric attacks into asymmetric ones. Once this is done, MA ap-
plies Dung’s evaluation of the justified arguments to propose a solution (Figure
2). In order to assign this preference between mutually attacking arguments the
MA again references the DCK, the CBRc and the AEM. From each resource the
MA derives a preference assignment. These may all be in agreement (e.g. A3
preferred to A2) or not, i.e. some prefer one argument while another knowledge
resource prefers the other argument. The MA’s task, is to provide a solution
that accounts for each of the knowledge resources’ preference assignment. So a
solution in which not all resources agree could be of the type: -While guidelines
indicate that S2 is not a solution to problem P2, trustworthy experts argue that
S2 is a solution to P2 and this position is weakly backed up by evidence. On
the basis of this information, the person responsible for the final decision will
decide whether or not to perform action X.
Many works addressing cooperative environments (e.g. production and lo-
5Also interesting is the work presented in [14], where a pruning of which arguments to
account for is made in order to compute dialectical trees efficiently.
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gistics [18, 49]) feature an agent, or set of agents, dedicated to coordinate the
tasks performed by the different working components or agents. In argumen-
tation, the role of the mediator agent is usually associated with negotiation
dialogues [13, 50, 38], where the main objective of the mediator agent is to help
reconcile the competing agents’ positions, for which the mediator agent usually
relies on mental models of the participants. More relevant here is the concep-
tual framework for negotiation dialogues SANA [38], that proposes a number
of so called artifacts, such as a social Dialogue Artifact, that acts as a media-
tor which regulates the agents dialogue interaction and a social Argumentation
Artifact that can be regarded as a sophisticated commitment store, where the
agents’ submitted arguments, as well as other arguments that may be publicly
available, are organised and their social acceptability status can be evaluated
following different algorithms. Similar to our approach, the SANA framework
defines, as part of the social Dialogue Artifact, an Argumentation Store (AS)
that stores a collection of socially acceptable arguments. The main difference
being, that while a central part of ProCLAIM is the definition of the structure
and relation of the schemes in ASR tailored for the specific purpose of deliber-
ating over safety critical actions, the SANA’s AS is presented as a placeholder
for any argument scheme, that is, developers are given little guidance on which
argument schemes the AS should encode. In a broader view, the SANA ap-
proach is similar to that proposed in the FP6-European project ASPIC, where
a set of generic components were developed: (Inference Engine, Dialogue Man-
ager, Learning Component, Decision-Making component) that can be plugged
into an agent in order to add argumentation capabilities. This is the approach
undertaken in [53] to implement ProCLAIM in the transplant scenario.
Due to the critical nature of the intended scenarios, ProCLAIM assumes a
rather regulated environment. In particular, ProCLAIM does not address any of
the normative aspects that would naturally be associated with a safety critical
environment. It also assumes that issues such as information privacy, or foreign
attacks from malicious agents are also resolved. A good example of the context
in which ProCLAIM can be used is the transplant scenario we now introduce,
where the model is used to extend an existing agent-based organisation [58] so
that agents can deliberate over the viability of an available human organ.
3 The Transplant Scenario
The shortage of human organs for transplantation is a serious problem, and is ex-
acerbated by the fact that current organ selection processes discard a significant
number of organs deemed non-viable (not suitable) for transplantation. The or-
gan viability assessment illustrates the ubiquity of disagreement and conflict of
opinion in the medical domain. What may be a sufficient reason for discard-
ing an organ for some qualified professionals may not be for others. Different
policies in different hospitals and regions exist, and a consensus among medi-
cal professionals is not always feasible. Hence, contradictory conclusions may
be derived from the same set of facts. For example, consider a donor with a
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smoking history but no chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The
medical guidelines indicate that a donor’s smoking history is a sufficient reason
for deeming a donor’s lung as non-viable. However, there are qualified physi-
cians that reason that the donor’s lung is viable given that there is no history of
COPD [27]. Similarly, the guidelines suggest discarding the kidney of a donor
whose cause of death was streptococcus viridans endocarditis (sve). However, by
administrating penicillin to the recipient this means that the kidney can safely
be transplanted.
Currently, the decision to offer or discard an organ available for transplan-
tation, is based solely on the assessment of doctors at the donor site (Donor
Agent, DA). This organ selection process does not account for the fact that:
1) medical doctors may disagree on whether an organ is viable or non-viable;
2) different policies in different hospitals and regions exist, and; 3) viability is
not an intrinsic property of the donor’s organ, but rather, an integral concept
that involves the donor and recipient characteristics as well as the courses of
action to be undertaken in the transplantation process [27]. In particular, cur-
rent organ selection processes allow for a DA to discard an organ that doctors
at the recipient site (Recipient Agents, RA) may claim to be viable and, given
the chance, could provide strong arguments to support this claim.
In [54] a novel organ selection process is proposed in which ProCLAIM is
used to coordinate joint deliberation between donor and recipient agents in
order to prevent the discard of organs due to the application of inappropriate
organ acceptability criteria, and so help to reduce the disparity between the
demand for and supply of organs. This proposal is framed within an agent-
based organisation called CARREL [58], intended to efficiently manage the data
to be processed in carrying out recipient selection, organ and tissue allocation,
ensuring adherence to legislation, following approved protocols and preparing
delivery plans.
The ProCLAIM model is thus used to extend CARREL so that DA and
RA can effectively deliberate over the viability of an available organ. In short,
ProCLAIM is instantiated as follows: the participant agents are the DA and
RA, the Guideline Knowledge encodes the donor and organ acceptability criteria
consented by the transplant organisations, i.e. the criteria the medical doctors
should refer to when deciding the organs’ viability.6 The AEM relates to the
agents’ reputation. Namely, the MA may deem as stronger the arguments
endorsed by agents with good reputations (e.g. a RA representing a prestigious
transplant unit). Finally, the CBRc allows the MA to evaluate the submitted
arguments on the basis of past recorded transplantation cases.
In [53] a prototype of this model is presented and in [57] we focus on the
CBRc component. These two works assumed our first attempt to formalise an
ASR [56] in which the argument schemes were formalised and constructed in
a somewhat ad-hoc fashion, so hindering the application of ProCLAIM in new
6Transplant organisations periodically publish the consented organ acceptability criteria.
However, these criteria rapidly evolve because of the researchers’ effort in extending them to
reduce organ discards. Hence, the more advanced transplant units deviate from consented
criteria.
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scenarios (such as in the environmental scenario presented in [52]). For this
reason, in [51] we proposed a domain independent approach for the definition of
the argument schemes and that we now (in §5) describe in much more detail and
with some corrections and extensions. Furthermore, the prototype presented in
[53] implements an interaction protocol for persuasion dialogues [41], which, as
discussed in §1.2, is not always appropriate for collaborative decision making.
In the following section we present ProCLAIM’s deliberation dialogue.
4 ProCLAIM’s Deliberation Dialogue
In this section we describe the interaction protocol that governs ProCLAIM’s
dialogue. In each exchanged locution we distinguish three interaction levels:
1) On the deepest level there is the content of the message, e.g. the submitted
arguments. 2) Each of these messages is wrapped in the appropriate deliberation
locution defined by the dialogue game (e.g. an argument is wrapped in an argue
locution); 3) in turn, each of these deliberation locutions is wrapped in either
an inform or request locution. This is because the Participant Agents (PAs)
always interact with the MA, never with other PAs. They submit a request to,
for example, enter the dialogue, submit a new argument or add new information.
The MA then decides whether to accept or reject their request. Thus, the MA
acts as a proxy for the PAs (see figure 3a.)
In the following subsection we describe the inform-request interaction which
we call the proxy dialogue game. And in §4.2, we introduce ProCLAIM’s de-
liberation dialogue game where we define the locutions that can be submitted
at each stage and layer of the deliberation. While the provided description of
the dialogue game is quiet detailed, to further facilitate its implementation, we
intend for future work define the dialogue game’s axiomatic semantics defining
the pre and post conditions for each dialogue move.
4.1 Proxy Dialogue Game
Agents participate in the deliberation via theMA, which decides whether an in-
coming message should be accepted or rejected. Messages are obviously rejected
if syntactically ill-formed, but also if the content is not appropriate. For exam-
ple, a submitted argument may be rejected if the MA deems it non relevant
for the deliberation. For that reason, each participant message is wrapped in a
request locution to which the MA replies with an inform locution, either to
inform of its rejection (and why it is rejected) or to act upon the request. For ex-
ample, if the request is to enter the dialogue,MA will inform of the participant’s
acceptance, along with the extra information required for the appropriate par-
ticipation. The MA may also send an inform locution without prior requests,
e.g. to inform of a time-out constraint which forces the deliberation to conclude.
request(pa id, ma, conv id,msg id, target id, R): where pa id is the
sender’s id (a PA), ma is the receiver agent (the MA), conv id is the
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conversation id, msg id is the message identifier, target id is the mes-
sage to which this locution is directed (when the message is not directed
to any specific message, target id should be set to -1). R is a variable
denoting the content being communicated in the request locution. The
possible values of R are discussed in the following subsection.
inform(ma,PA,conv id,msg id,target id, I): Here, the locution may be ad-
dressed to a single receiver, in which case PA is pa id, or it may be broad-
cast to all the participants, in which case PA is all, or to a subgroup
of PAs, e.g. to all but the sender of the request all - {pa id}. I is a
variable denoting the content being communicated in the inform locution,
which may be in reply to a request of a PA’s request.
In the following subsection we define the messages’ content, i.e., the R and the
I.
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Figure 3: a) Illustrating the proxy dialogue game; b) Depiction of ProCLAIM’s
deliberation dialogue game with its stages and interaction layers.
4.2 The Deliberation Dialogue Game
In this subsection we introduce ProCLAIM’s deliberation dialogue game. That
is, we introduce the legal locutions, together with the rules which govern their
use as well as the commencement and termination of the deliberation dialogue.
As illustrated in 3a the deliberation dialogue game can be subdivided in three
stages: Open, Deliberation and Resolutions. While the Deliberation Stage can
in turn be subdivided in three layers: Argumentation, Context, Endorsement
layers. The moves in these three layers may happen in parallel and the moves
at one layer may have an effect on another layer. As depicted in 3b we define yet
another interaction layer, called Information layer in which PAs can request the
MA for updates on ongoing deliberation. It is worth noting that these distinct
layers and stages are conceptual and are used as metaphors to better organise












Figure 4: Deliberation dialogue, stage transition. We use deliberation move
to indicate any dialogue move defined in the Deliberation Stage (e.g. assert,
argue, endorse...). Note that to move from the Deliberation Stage into the Res-
olution Stage all PA must have submitted the no more moves move. Similarly,
to conclude the deliberation all PA must have submitted the accept move, un-
less the time out has been triggered. If any PA submits a deliberation move,
while being a the Resolution Stage, the dialogue moves back to the Deliberation
Stage.
4.2.1 Open Stage:
The first stage is Open in which the proposal is made, the participants are
introduced and basic available information is provided to all participants:
open dialogue(proposal): proposal is an argument proposing the main ac-
tion (e.g. transplant an available organ). proposal also contains the
preconditions for the action’s performance (e.g. an available organ and a
potential recipient). As we see in §5, proposal is an instantiation of an
argument scheme.
If the proposal is made by a PA (and not by the MA), this message is
wrapped in a request locution that the MA would have to validate. If the re-
quest is validated, theMA will submit the open dialogue locution and contact
the potential participants in order to enter the dialogue.
enter dialogue(proposal,role, basic info): Each agent willing to partic-
ipate in a deliberation over proposal will enter her role in the deliber-
ation (e.g. donor or recipient agent) and the information (basic info)
she deems potentially relevant for the decision making (e.g. the patient’s
clinical record). This message is wrapped in a request locution.
If the enter dialogue is accepted, the introduced facts, via basic info,
will be stored in a set of facts, which we denote CF .7 Similarly, we define a
second set denoted as CA which contains the agents’ proposed actions. Ini-
tially CF contains only the facts introduced in the enter dialogue locution
and the preconditions introduced in the argument proposing the main action.
7We will assume that all facts introduced by the PAs are consistent, we discuss this in
more detail in §9.
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When the deliberation starts CA contains only the initially proposed action (e.g.
transplant the available organ to the potential recipient).
For simplicity, let us denote CF and CA together as CF∧A. During the
deliberation CF∧A may be updated, this happens at the Context Layer (§4.2.2).
The proposal proposal made in open dialogue(proposal) is an argument
for the main action. Thus, this is the first argument added to the tree of ar-
guments T. Further submitted arguments at the Argumentation Layer (§4.2.3)
will update T.
A PA may request to enter the dialogue at the beginning of the deliberation,
or later, when both CF∧A and T may have more information than the minimal
information available at the beginning. Thus if at any stage an agent’s request
to participate is accepted, the MA will reply by broadcasting the following
message.
entered dialogue(proposal, role, basic info, pas, CF∧A,T,
legal replies): The MA informs all the participants that an agent
enacting the role role just entered in the deliberation and has introduced
the information basic info. The MA also informs, of the PAs already
in the deliberation pas, as well as of the updated values of CF∧A and T.
Within this message the MA attaches the legal replies (legal replies)
to the arguments in T. This set of legal replies (argument schemes and
critical questions) will guide the PA on which argument moves they can
submit as a reply to those in T. (This is further discussed in §6.2).
Thus, for example, if an agent with id ag id enacting the role role id wishes
to enter the deliberation over the proposal proposal she will send a request lo-
cution:
request(ag id,ma,conv id,0,-1,enter dialogue(proposal,role id,
basic info))
If the MA accepts the request it will broadcast to all but ag id that an agent
playing the role role id has entered the dialogue and reply to agent ag id that
her request was accepted:
inform(ma, all-{ag id},conv id,1,-1, enter dialogue(proposal,
role id, basic info, pas, CF∧A, T, legal replies))
inform(ma, ag id, conv id,1,0,entered dialogue(proposal, role id,
basic info, pas, CF∧A, T, legal replies))
If the request is rejected theMA informs the PA with id ag id why her request
was rejected.
inform(ma, ag id, conv id, 1, 0, rejected(reason)).
Once a PA enters the dialogue it moves into the deliberation stage ant it
can interact in its three layers:
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4.2.2 Context Layer:
Once an agent enters the dialogue it can inform of facts it deems potentially
relevant for the decision making, as well as propose complementary courses of
actions that may prevent undesirable side effects that may be caused by the
main action.
assert(fact): a PA asserts that the fact fact is the case. If accepted, fact
is added to CF .
propose(action): a PA proposes to perform the action action. If accepted,
action is added to CA.
retract(fact): a PA retracts an assertion that a fact fact is the case. If
accepted, fact is removed from CF .
retract(action): a PA retracts the proposal to perform the action action.
If accepted, action is removed from CA.
Each of the above messages, when sent by a PA, is wrapped in a request
locution. If they are accepted, they will be broadcast to all participants by the
MA.
Participants may assert and retract facts as well as propose and retract ac-
tions, at any time, as long as the deliberation is open. The only restriction is that
facts and actions asserted or proposed cannot be inconsistent8. Hence, given
a consequence relation ` and a background theory Γ, then CF and CA must
be such that CF0Γ ⊥ and CA0Γ ⊥. For instance, CF cannot contain both: a)
the donor does not have cancer and b) the donor has a malignant tumour.9. In
other words, the state of affairs defined in CF∧A , though may be uncertain and
may evolve throughout the deliberation, cannot be inconsistent.
At the current state of development, ProCLAIM does not support a conflict
resolution among PAs that disagree over the described contexts of facts. From
our explored scenarios (transplant and environmental) we have learned to be odd
for one PA to dispute another PA’s state of affairs description. This is because,
each PA provides information on that she has a privileged access to. Hence,
it is odd for a DA to dispute the information about a potential recipient given
by a RA; similarly for an agent representing an industry to dispute information
regarding the status of the wastewater treatment plant. For this reason, and in
order to keep the deliberation focused, conflicts regarding whether or not a fact x
is the case is either resolved outside ProCLAIM (e.g. by facilitating a persuasion
dialogue or via a phone call) or should take x as uncertain. Nonetheless, as we
will see in §5.2.3, PAs can still challenge an argument requesting evidence in
support of some fact and may highlight the weakness of that evidence, which
may motivate the retraction of the disagreed upon fact (e.g. the retraction of
8Where by inconsistent actions we mean actions that cannot be performed simultaneously
(e.g. heat and cool, stay and go, etc...).
9Note however that CF may contain a) clinical records indicate the donor does not have
cancer and b) the donor has cancer
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x, which leaves room to the submission of ¬x ). In future work we intend to
further develop this intuition, which may lead extending ProCLAIM to support
such conflict resolution.
Note that the facts and actions introduced at this layer of the deliberation
(i.e. CF∧A) do not themselves indicate whether or not the main proposed ac-
tion is safe. CF∧A is the context in which the main action is intended to be
performed. Participants should thus decide whether the proposed action is safe
given this context, where CF∧A may change during the course of the delib-
eration. This decision making occurs at the Argumentation Layer. Although
clearly, if the main proposed action or the preconditions for such an action are
retracted, the deliberation concludes.
4.2.3 Argumentation Layer:
At the argumentation layer there are only two locutions: argue and challenge.
A PA uses these locutions to request submitting an argument or a challenge. A
challenge made on an argument questions the validity of the argument. From
the perspective of an argumentation framework challenges can be represented as
regular arguments that attack the argument under challenge. If the PA’s request
for submitting an argument or a challenge is accepted, the MA broadcasts this
move to all participants using its version of the argue and challenge locutions.
When this request is rejected, the MA’s reply occurs at the proxy layer. Let
us mark the locutions made by PAs with an R for request, and the MA’s
broadcasting message with an I for inform:
R: argue(argument, target): an argument argument is submitted by a PA
in reply (as an attack) to the argument or challenge in T, whose id is
target. If the argument is accepted it will be broadcasted to all partici-
pants.
I: argue(id, argument, target, legal replies): an argument argument
submitted in reply (as an attack) to the argument or challenge whose
id is target, has been accepted by the MA who broadcasts it to all
participants, indicating that the argument’s id is id. Within the same
message, theMA attaches the legal replies (legal replies) to argument.
This set of legal replies (argument schemes and critical questions) will
guide the PA on which argument moves they can submit at each point of
the deliberation (this is further discussed in §6.2). argument is also added
to T, attacking the argument or challenge with id target.
R: challenge(challenge, target): a challenge
challenge is made by a PA on an argument in T with id target. In
reply to a challenge participants can submit an argument that meets the
challenge (see §5.2.3).
I: challenge(id,challenge, target, legal replies): a challenge challenge
made on an argument with id target has been accepted by the MA who
20
broadcasts it to all participants, indicating that the challenge’s id is id.
Within the same message, theMA attaches the legal replies (legal replies)
to challenge. The challenge is added to T as an argument attacking the
argument with id target.
All participants, including theMA, can submit arguments and challenges at
any time as long as the deliberation is open and the target argument or challenge
is in T. However, theMA can reject a submitted argument or challenge because
it is not a relevant move. That is, the MA’s validation task introduced in §2 is
performed at the proxy layer.
The fact that a participant submits an argument does not imply she endorses
it. A participant may attack her own submitted arguments with other moves.
This is because it is a collaborative setting, as opposed to a competitive one.
Participants introduce the knowledge they have of the problem in the form of
arguments. Thus, for example, the same agent can highlight a contraindication
for performing the main action (attacking the initial argument) but then propose
a complementary action that will mitigate its undesirable side effects and thus
reinstate the main action proposal. In the same spirit, once a challenge or
argument is added to T participants cannot retract it, i.e. delete it from T. As
discussed in §2, if an argument is added to T it is because the MA deemed the
argument to be relevant for the deliberation. An argument may of course be
defeated, but it should remain in the tree of arguments.
4.2.4 Endorsement Layer:
As arguments are added to the tree of arguments, participants can decide which
arguments they endorse. This endorsement will affect MA’s argument evalua-
tion. For example, arguments endorsed by participants with a good reputation
will be deemed stronger. Nonetheless, this argument may still be weak because,
for instance, there is strong empirical evidence against it. The locutions at the
Endorsement Layer are:
endorse(pa id,arg id): The participant pa id endorses argument or chal-
lenge with id arg id.
retract endorsement(pa id,arg id): The participant pa id retracts her en-
dorsement of argument or challenge with id arg id.
These moves can be submitted at any time while the dialogue is open and on
any argument or challenge on T. If an agent endorses two conflicting arguments,
the later endorsement prevails and the earlier is automatically retracted.
When an endorsement (resp. its retraction) of an argument or challenge in
T is made by a PA (via a request locution), the MA adds (resp. subtracts) this
endorsement (represented as the predicate endorse(pa id,arg id)) from the
endorsement set, which we denote as E.
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4.2.5 Resolution Stage:
Once participants have constructed the context of facts and actions CF∧A, the
tree of arguments T, and have informed of their endorsements, theMA proceeds
to evaluate T. The deliberation moves into the Resolution Stage either because
all the participants have informed that they have no further moves to submit
that may change either CF∧A, T, or E; or because a timeout was triggered.
In either case, the MA proposes a solution for the deliberation, based on the
evaluation of T. If a timeout has been triggered, PAs will not have the chance to
revise the proposed solution. In §7 we briefly discuss the nature of the argument
evaluation and how a recommended solution is not merely a yes/no answer.
no more moves(): The participant informs that she has no further moves to
submit (moves that may change either CF∧A, T, or E), for consistency
she does so via a request move. Once all participants submitted this
move, the MA proceeds to evaluate T. This move, however, does not
prevent participants from submitting further moves, overriding her own
move of no more moves. This is important to allow because new relevant
information may be available at any time and should be included in the
deliberation. If the move no more moves is overridden, the deliberation
moves again the deliberation stage.
leave dialogue(reason): The participant request that to leave the deliber-
ation and may provide a reason reason for that. If this move is ac-
cepted by the MA all PAs will be informed that the participant has
left the deliberation. Of course, if all participants leave the deliberation
the deliberation concludes and the MA will propose a solution (via the
close deliberation locution) on the basis of the available knowledge
CF∧A, T, and E.
time out(reason): The MA informs that a timeout has been triggered. In
general terms this means that too much time has been spent in the de-
liberation and so a new resolution policy should be applied. For instance,
picking-up the telephone. How to proceed with a timeout is application
dependent. Provisionally we formalise it as a trigger for the MA to eval-
uate T with the available knowledge (CF∧A, T, and E) and propose a
solution while disabling any further moves from the participants. The
MA may provide a reason reason for the timeout.
solution(solution,sol id): Once all participants have submitted the
no more moves (and did not override it with any other move) the MA
proposes a solution solution whose id is sol id. The proposed solution
may motivate participants to submit further moves or to simply accept
the solution. If a participant submits a move of the Deliberation Stage, she
should again submit the no more moves locution for the MA to propose
the new solution. However, if the timeout is triggered, the deliberation will
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conclude with the given solution providing no chance for the participants
to submit further moves10.
accept(sol id): Once a solution with id sol id is given, if all agents accept
it, the deliberation concludes.
close deliberation(solution,sol id): The deliberation is closed with the
proposed solution solution. This locution is submitted either after all
participants have submitted the accept(sol id) move or the timeout has
been triggered and the MA has proposed a solution.
We are working under the assumption that the CBRc (case based reasoning
component) is time consuming and requires the full T for argument evaluation.
However, if we manage to develop a CBRc whose performance can be adjusted to
real-time deliberation, a proposal for resolution of the T will always be visible for
the participants and the cycle solution(solution,id sol), accept(id sol)
will not be necessary. It would be enough to submit the no more moves locution.
4.2.6 Inform Layer:
Throughout the deliberation dialogue, participants can request from the MA
an update of the argument tree, in which facts have been introduced, or request
for the legal replies to a given argument or challenge in T. Thus, if for what-
ever reason a participant misses a piece of information she can recover it upon
request.
R: get arg tree(): A PA requests the MA for the updated T.
I: arg tree(T): The MA informs a PA of the updated T.
R: get context(): A PA requests the MA for the updated CF∧A.
I: context(CF , CA): The MA informs a PA of the updated CF∧A.
R: get endorsement(): A PA requests the MA for the updated E.
I: endorsement(E): The MA informs a PA of the updated E.
R: get legal replies(arg id): A PA requests the MA for the legal replies
to an argument or challenge in T with id arg id.
I: legal replies(arg id, legal replies): The MA informs a PA of the
legal replies to an argument or challenge in T with id arg id.
The above described dialogue game is rather liberal. PAs can submit almost
any locutions at any time during the deliberation. There are of curse a few
restrictions such as at the proxy level the MA has the obligation to reply to the
10In that case, the decision making process may indeed continue, but following a different
policy.
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PA’s requests. Also, the deliberation dialogue can only be opened once, PAs
can only request to enter the dialogue if they are not already in it and they
cannot participate once the deliberation is either closed or they have left it (via
the leave dialogue locutions). As long as the timeout has not been triggered,
PAs can submit any move of the Deliberation Stage with no turn restrictions.
That is PAs can submit any fact (resp. complementary action) at any time
of the deliberation, as long as this fact (resp. action) is not already asserted
(resp. proposed) or it is inconsistent with CF (resp. CA). Similarly, PAs can
retract any facts and actions in CF∧A. PAs can submit the argue or challenge
locution at any time of the deliberation, as long as it is open and the timeout
has not been triggered. The target of their argument or challenge must be an
element of T and, in particular, they can attack their own arguments and they
do not have any obligation to defend their arguments from other arguments or
challenges. What is at stake is not who is right or wrong, but whether or not
the main action can safely be performed.
It is at the Argumentation Layer that the deliberation is kept highly focused
on the subject matter, through definition of the arguments and challenges the
PAs can submit throughout the deliberation. That is, the set of legal replies (ar-
gument schemes and CQs) made available to the participants. In the following
section we describe in detail the Argumentation Layer.
5 ProCLAIM Argumentation Layer
One of the pillars of ProCLAIM is the definition of the deliberation dialogue’s
Argumentation Layer, namely, what types of arguments participants can ex-
change and following what rules. As a way to keep deliberations focused as
well as reducing the participants’ overhead in terms of argument construction,
ProCLAIM is quite specific in what can be argued about and how. To this end,
the model defines a protocol-based exchange of arguments that can be regarded
as an argumentative process for eliciting knowledge from the participants, as
opposed to defining a strategic dialogue in which a better choice of arguments
may better serve the agents’ individual goals. This argumentation-protocol is
defined in terms of a structured set (a circuit) of schemes and their associated
CQs (to a scheme are associated a set of CQs which are themselves defined in
terms of schemes that have associated CQs, and so on...). ProCLAIM defines
an application-independent protocol-based exchange of arguments specialised
for arguing over safety critical actions. Then, for each target application (e.g.
transplant or environmental scenario) this application-independent protocol has
to be further specialised in order to construct the scenario-specific ASR11. This
is discussed in §6.1.
In this section we present the application-independent circuit of AS and
CQs. We start by introducing in the following subsection the internal structure




5.1 The Structure of an Argument
Action proposals are typically motivated by the goals agents wish to realise.
Many formal accounts ([48, 19, 60, 59]) of action proposal assume, though some-
times implicitly, the following three dimensions:
R: Domain of facts in circumstances where the action is proposed.
A: Domain of actions.
G: Domain of goals.
Based on these domains the following argument can be constructed ‘an action
A is proposed in circumstances R (a set of facts) because it is expected to realise
a desirable goal G’. The problem with such an argument structure is that the
notion of a goal is ambiguous, potentially referring indifferently to any direct
result of the action, the consequence of those results and the reasons why those
consequences are desired [4]. To account for these distinctions, Atkinson et al.
considered two additional domains:
S: Domain of facts arrived after performing the action.
V: Domain of values where the values represent the social interests promoted
through achieving the goal.
in order to propose the following argument scheme for action proposals:
AtkSch:
In the circumstances R
we should perform action A
to achieve new circumstances S
which will realise some goal G12
which will promote some value V
This argument scheme is presented along with sixteen associated CQs which can
be classified into three categories: What is true ( e.g. –Questioning the descrip-
tion of the current circumstances–), what is best (e.g. –Questioning whether the
consequences can be realised by some alternative action–) and representational
inconsistencies (e.g. –Questioning whether the desired features can be realised–
). In [4] AtkSch along with its sixteen CQs are used to define a persuasion
dialogue game for reasoning about action proposal.
Atkinson’s persuasion dialogue is primarily addressed at resolving a choice
amongst competing action proposals, choosing which action is the best, i.e.
which action will bring about the best situation, where ‘best’ is relative to
an agent and consideration is given to subjective value-based judgements, as
well as more objective ones. In arguing about action proposals, participants
12Where a goal is some particular subset of S that the action is intended to realised in order
to promote the desired value.
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may undermine an action proposal by questioning whether the action will bring
about any undesirable effects13. This is just one possibility in the persuasion
dialogue; one can also argue as to which goals are desirable or not. In short,
participants can argue about whatever is reasonable when deciding what to do
in general terms. This generality is indeed a desirable feature of Atkinson’s
persuasion dialogue and for that reason this work is taken as a starting point
for the definition of ProCLAIM’s Argumentation Layer. However, precisely
because of this openness, it is inoperable for our intended applications.
In ProCLAIM, the desirable and undesirable goals are assumed to be shared
by all participants. Furthermore, the main proposed action itself (e.g. trans-
plant an organ or spill the industrial wastewater) is, in default circumstances,
taken to be the right thing to do, requiring no further motivation in its proposal.
Moreover, decisions in ProCLAIM are taken with respect to a single social value
safety (or patient’s quality of life, in the transplant scenario). Therefore, the
value dimension can be ignored14. A particular consequence of this defined con-
text is that PA’s individual goals and values, while may affect which arguments
they submit and endorse, in themselves do not constitute a reason for or against
a proposed action. What becomes a matter of debate then, is whether the cur-
rent circumstances are such that the proposed action can safely be performed.
Namely, whether or not the context of facts CF , constructed at the Context
Layer, is such that the main action will bring about severe undesirable side
effects. The deliberation can thus be regarded as an argumentative process for
eliciting from the participants (experts) what are the relevant facts (f0,..,fn ∈
CF ) for assessing the action’s safety, accounting for the complementary courses
of actions (those actions added to CA). A formal definition of the relevance of
a set of facts is given later in this section (Definition 5.1).
To illustrate the relevance of facts in the medical scenario, let us suppose
a donor of a lung is infected with the Hepatitis C virus (hcv). Now, it can
be argued that the transplant is unsafe (argument A2 in fig. 5) because the
recipient of the transplanted lung will result in having hcv, which is a severe
infection. Thus, the donor being infected with hcv is a relevant fact, given
that, because of this fact the transplant will cause an undesirable side effect.
Suppose now that the potential recipient also has hcv. And so, it cannot be
claimed that, for this recipient, having hcv is an undesirable side effect of the
lung transplant (argument A3 in fig. 5). Therefore, the potential recipient’s hcv
is a relevant fact. It is because that fact holds that the action does not cause
an undesirable side effect. Note however, that if the donor would not have had
hcv, whether the recipient has hcv or not, is irrelevant. That is, relevance is
context dependent. An attack on argument A3 will assume a context in which
the donor and recipient both have hcv. Let us suppose that there are other
13We cannot assume that because the effect is undesirable it must be a side effect of the
action. It may actually be a state of affairs that, from the perspective of one participant, is a
desirable outcome of the action, but not for all participants.
14It may be interesting to bring into the deliberation the cost value. Some proposed actions
although deemed safe, cannot be taken because the system cannot afford the expenses incurred
by the actions. We leave such an extension for future work.
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contraindications for the transplantation that, at least a priori, are independent
of the donor and recipient’s hcv. For example, that the available lung is too
big for the recipient’s thoracic cavity. Such an argument will directly attack
argument A1, where the context, or to be more precise, the local context, is
that an available organ is proposed for transplantation into a given patient. To
capture this notion, we explicitly associate to each argument a local context of
facts and of actions.
...
donor is a male
donor has HCV....







donor is a male
donor has HCV
....



















Figure 5: As arguments are submitted facts are highlighted as relevant. Note
that for example, it has not been deemed relevant that the recipient is 45 years
old or the donor is a male. Moreover, if the donor would not have had HCV
(Hepatitis C virus), the recipient’s HCV may have not been highlighted either.
We denote the local context of actions of an argument as A, and the
local context of facts as C. Upon submission of the first argument, A
and C are empty. These are updated so that for any subsequent submitted
argument A contains the proposed action itself (e.g. the transplant proposal)
and C the minimum set of facts where the proposed action can be performed
(e.g. an available organ and a potential recipient). In general, each submitted
argument updates its C and A to account for the particularities of each case
(e.g. the donor’s and recipient’s particularities). In the previous example we
saw how argument A2 extended C to include the donor’s hcv. Argument A3
then extended C by adding the recipient’s hcv. Note that while these facts were
already in the (global) context CF , it’s through their use in the argumentation
that they are highlighted as relevant. Thus, for a set of facts (resp. actions) to
be added to C (resp. to A) it must be relevant. Meaning that, within their
local context these facts or complementary actions make the main action safe
or unsafe.
To continue with the identification of the elements and relations of Pro-
CLAIM’s arguments, let us recall that a ProCLAIM argument expresses a re-
lation among the four domains: current state (R), actions (A), arrived states
(S) and goals (G). We can further constrain S and G so that S contains only
side effects of the actions in A, and G contains only undesirable goals which
such side effects may realise.
Let us also recall, that the intended effects of the main proposed action are
assume to be desirable and so, they are beyond question.
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Let us formalise these domains in terms of finite sets of grounded predicates
which will be written in teletype, e.g. av org(d,o) ∈ R meaning that an
organ o of a donor d is available.
ProCLAIM arguments express relations between elements of the above domains.
Specifically, the following elements:
C: The local context of facts assumed to be the case, where C ⊆ R.
A: The local contexts of proposed actions, where A ⊆ A.
R: A set of facts, where R ⊆ R. For more than one set of facts we write R1,
R2,... We denote by Rp the set of facts introduced as preconditions for
the performance of a proposed action.
A: A set of actions, where A ⊆ A. We write Am to denote the main set of
actions and Ac the complementary courses of actions argued to prevent
the achievement of an undesirable side effect. For more than one set of
complementary actions we write Ac1, Ac2,...
S: The set of side effects caused by the proposed action, where S ⊆ S. For
more than one set of side effects we write S1, S2,...
g: The undesirable goal realised by S, where g ∈ G. For more than one goal
we write g1, g2,...
Different argument schemes defined by ProCLAIM correspond to different
relations amongst these elements, where these relations are expressed in terms
of special predicates, and a defeasible consequence relation |∼ from which con-
clusions follow defeasibly or non-monotonically from the set of premises. We
thus assume:
• A defeasible consequence relation |∼;
• A background theory Γ;
• The special predicate side effect on subsets of S where side effect(S),
with S ⊆ S, denotes that S are side effects given a background contexts
of facts C and actions A .
• The special predicate intended15 on subsets of A where intended(Ac),
with Ac ⊆ A, denotes that the set of actions Ac is intended.
Given a set of facts or actions, we assume its conjunction to be the case, respec-
tively proposed. And, if A and B are two sets of either facts or actions, to say
that all the elements in A and of B hold, are respectively intended, we write
A ∧B.
15In the deliberation presented in this work we do not distinguish between intending and
only proposing to perform an action. This is discussed in §5.2.5.
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Thus, for example, we can write: R∧C∧intended(A)∧Γ|∼ side effect(S).
Meaning that if R and C are the case, the proposed actions A will result in the
set of side effects S. The rationale as to why A will cause S is in the background
theory Γ. Each agent and knowledge resource defines its own version of Γ,
which may contain different rules and reasoning techniques. For example, a
basic artificial agent may contain a fixed table with precodified 4-tuples relating
the four dimensions R × A × S × G. A slightly more sophisticated artificial
agent will define an internal structure to each of the four dimensions with a
number of transition rules. A human agent, on the other hand, will use her
own reasoning (her own version of Γ and |∼;) to reason about the exchanged
arguments. However, all these heterogeneous agents will have to agree on the
syntax and semantics of the exchanged ProCLAIM arguments.
Typically the background theory is written as a subscript on the conse-
quence relations: |∼Γ. To emphasise that C and A are assumed to be the
case, i.e. that they are contextual information, they are also written as sub-
scripts on the consequence relations: |∼C∧A∧Γ. This notation has no effect
on the consequence relation, but it allow us to single out particular elements
in the relation: e.g. to highlight the set of facts R in the consequence relation
R|∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S). We also take the liberty of omitting the intended
predicate wrapping the actions.
With these elements and relations the relevance of a set of facts and actions
(w.r.t. realising an undesirable goal) can be defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 Within the context of facts C and of proposed actions A a
set of facts R ⊆ R is said to be relevant if one of the following two situations
holds:
• In circumstances C, if R holds the actions A will cause an undesirable
side effect. Otherwise, if R does not hold, the undesirable side effect is no
longer expected to be caused by A (in circumstances C ):
– R|∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S);
– side effect(S)|∼R∧C∧Γ g and
– |C∧A∧Γ side effect(S).
Or
• In circumstances C actions A will cause an undesirable side effect. But
if R holds, then either the side effect is not expected to be caused by A, or
the side effect cannot be deemed as undesirable ( i.e. the degree to which
the side effect realises the undesirable goal is too weak):
– |∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S) and
– side effect(S)|∼C∧Γ g
but either:
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– R|C∧A∧Γ side effect(S) or;
– R ∧ side effect(S)|C∧A∧Γ g
Note that when it is said that an undesirable side effect is not expected it is
strictly in the local context defined by C and A. This undesirable side effect
may well occur for other reasons, e.g., due to other facts not in C but in CF .
The definition of a relevant complementary course of actions is as follows:
Definition 5.2 Within the context of facts C and of proposed actions A a
set of actions Ac ⊆ A is said to be relevant if the preconditions Rp for its
performance hold (Rp ⊆CF ) and Ac either prevents an undesirable side effect
or it causes one.
That is:
• |∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S) and
• side effect(S)|∼C∧Γ g and
• Rp ∧ intended(Ac)|C∧A∧Γ side effect(S)
Or;
• Rp ∧ intended(Ac)|∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S) and
• side effect(S)|∼C∧Γ g and
• |C∧A∧Γ side effect(S).
In what follows we will use the above introduced concepts to define the
arguments schemes and their associated critical questions to be used in the
Argumentation Layer. Using these schemes and critical questions participants
will submit their arguments, highlighting with each argument the relevant facts
and complementary courses of actions. These relevant factors (facts or actions)
are the ones that can be added to the arguments’ local contexts. Once PAs
have submitted all their arguments, and so all the relevant facts and actions
have been introduced, the tree of arguments T is evaluated to resolve whether
the main action can safely be performed.
5.2 Protocol-Based Exchange of Arguments
In this section we introduce the argument schemes and their associated critical
questions tailored for deliberating over safety critical actions. Each of these
argument schemes encodes a particular relation among elements in R, A, S
and G. Arguments instantiating these schemes represent instances of these re-
lations, while their associated CQs question them. Thus, with the exchange of
arguments, participants build a subspace of R × A × S × G tailored to the
particular problem at hand. Hence, the deliberation process can be regarded as
a mechanism for exploring the relevant facts in R, accounting for the comple-
mentary courses of actions in A, guided by the (undesirable) side effects which
30
are highlighted in S and G . The relevant elements in R and A are those that
have an impact in S and G .
The schemes and critical questions will be introduced in amodular fashion.
We start by introducing a set of assumptions that will help in constructing a
basic circuit of six schemes and their associated CQs:
• Assum 1: R,A, S andG have no internal structure (e.g. no taxonomy).
These are Assum 1a, Assum 1b, Assum 1c and Assum 1d respectively.
• Assum 2: All introduced facts R are in CF . Arguments must use facts
that are in the context of facts CF .
• Assum 3: a) All proposed actions A are in CA , b) they can be performed
(Rp ⊆ CF ), c) and they do not conflict with other proposed actions (i.e.
no two or more action are such that if jointly performed they cause an
undesirable side effect).
• Assum 4: Each g ∈ G is such that if the main action will realise g the
action is deemed unsafe.
As we relax some of these assumptions we will be extending this circuit of AS
and CQs. In §5.2.2 we enrich R with a taxonomy by introducing a specificity
relation. In §5.2.3 we add a defeasible entailment to R to allow for uncertainty.
In §5.2.4 we permit the use of facts not in CF , in order to account for incom-
plete information. Finally, in §5.2.5 we discuss other extensions that we are
formalising.
5.2.1 Basic Argument Schemes
In this subsection we present the basic protocol-based exchange of arguments
consisting of six argument schemes and their associated critical questions by
which players participate in the deliberation, introducing new relevant facts
and complementary courses of actions.
Each scheme is presented as a four part composite: A set of preconditions,
the scheme’s body, its associated critical questions and the scheme’s context up-
dating rule by which the arguments’ local contexts (C and A ) are updated.
The body of the scheme is itself presented in three complementary representa-
tions: a narrative version written in natural language; a formal version; and the
deliberation’s dialogue locutions, i.e. the content of the argue and challenge
locutions introduced in §4.2. Let us start by introducing the first argument
scheme, AS1, that sets the deliberation’s topic. In fact, this scheme is instanti-
ated at the deliberation’s Open Stage (§4.2) as the proposal. This first argument
is the root of T.
Let us just introduce some notation, scheme AS1 proposes the main ac-
tion under the assumption that Am will cause no undesirable side effect: ∼
undSideEffect(Am), where ∼ denotes the weak negation. Subsequent argu-
ments will attack this assumption by highlighting an undesirable goal or defend




Preconditions: Rp ⊆ CF , Am ⊆ CA, C = {} and A = {}
Body:
In circumstances Rp




CQ1: Are circumstances such that an undesirable side effect will be
achieved?
Context Updating Rule: C := Rp; A := Am.
To illustrate the use of this scheme, let us introduce an example from the
transplant scenario, which we will develop throughout this paper. Let us sup-
pose a lung of a donor d is available (av org(d,lung)) for a potential recipient r
(p recip(r,lung)). And so the intention is to transplant the lung to this recip-
ient (transp(r,lung)). Hence, av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung) ∈ CF and
transp(r,lung)∈ CA. Therefore the initial argument, say A, can be submitted
instantiating AS1 as follows:
A: argue({},{},propose({av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung)},
{transp(r,lung)}))16
An argument instantiating AS1 proposes the main action making the as-
sumption that no undesirable goal will be realised. Any attack to such argument
involves arguing that this assumption is false, that an undesirable goal will be
realised. Typically, critical questions associated with a scheme enable agents to
attack the validity of the various elements of the scheme and the connections
between them. Also, there may be alternative possible actions and side effects
of the proposed action [4]. In the particular case of arguments instantiating
AS1 what can be questioned is whether there is a fact, or set of facts R, in the
current circumstances (R ⊆ CF ) that makes the proposed action unsafe. Hence,
what can be questioned is the assumption that there are no contraindications
for performing the proposed action. That is, critical question CQ1, which we
denote as AS1 CQ1, can be used.
16It is worth noting that an artificial agent may represent internally this argu-
ment in many forms, for instance in a more standard support-claim argument struc-
ture like < {av org(d,lung) ∧ p recip(r,lung)∧ ∼ undSideEffect(transp(r,lung)) ⇒
propose(transp(r,lung)), av org(d,lung), p recip(r,lung)}, propose(transp(r,lung)) >
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An answer ‘no’ to this question, implicitly encoded in the assumption of the
initial argument, would imply little progress in the deliberation. An answer ‘yes’
to this question constitutes an attack on the argument. Thus, for the deliber-
ation to effectively progress, AS1 CQ1 can only be addressed by introducing a
contraindication, i.e. a set of facts R that will result in the action causing an
undesirable side effect. This use of AS1 CQ1 is effected by an argument instan-
tiating the scheme AS2, and that attacks the argument instantiating AS1.
Finally, to illustrate the scheme’s context updating rule, note that any reply
to argument A will assume as contextual information that there is an available
lung of a donor d, a potential recipient r for that organ and that the trans-
plant is intended. That is, C = {av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung)} and A
= {transp(r,lung)}. Needless to say, if the assertion of any of these facts or
actions is retracted at the Context Layer, the deliberation concludes.
AS2
Preconditions: R ⊆ CF , S ⊆ S, S 6= ∅, g ∈ G, and
C and A the context of facts and actions of the target argument.
Body:
In circumstances C
Because R holds, actions A will cause a side effect S
which will realise some undesirable goal g.
◦ R |∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S); and
◦ side effect(S) |∼C∧R∧Γ g;
argue(C,A,contra(R,S,g));
Critical Questions:
CQ1: Are circumstances such that the stated side effect will not occur?
CQ2: Are circumstances such that the side effect will not realise the
stated goal?
CQ3: Is there a complementary course of action that prevents the
achievement of the stated effect?
Context Updating Rule: C := C ∪R; A := A.
An argument instantiating AS2 identifies contraindications R for performing
the proposed actions A, in circumstances C.
Continuing with the above example, let us suppose that the donor of the
offered lung has smoking history ( d p(d,s h): donor d has property s h). Let
us suppose, as well, that the donor agent, DA, that offers the lung for transplan-
tation, believes s h to be a contraindication because the lung may be rejected
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by the recipient, thus realising the undesirable goal grft fail(r). Hence, DA
believes AS1 CQ1 to be the case, and so may want to attack argument A. This
can be done by submitting an argument B1 (see fig. 6), that instantiates AS2
as follows:
B1: argue(C,A,contra({d p(d,s h)},{reject(r,lung)},grft fail(r)));
Let us now identify AS2’s critical questions. That is, which lines of attack
can be pursued in order to, for example, attack argument B1. For that pur-
pose, let us highlight what is being asserted by an argument instantiating AS2,
taking into account that C has been updated (e.g. in argument B1, C =
{av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung),
d p(d,s h)}) while A remains the same and that ProCLAIM arguments only
assert a relation among the sets R, A, S and G :
1. C ∧ A |∼Γ side effect(S); and
2. side effect(S) ∧C |∼Γ g;
Firstly, whether these two relations hold is evaluated first at the Proxy Level
(§4.1) where theMA validates the incoming arguments and latter at the Resolu-
tion Stage (§4.2) where a relative strength of the accepted arguments is assigned.
Secondly, under the assumptions presented at the beginning of this subsection,
the local contexts are such that C ⊆CF and A ⊆CA(Assum 2 and Assum 3a
resp) and thus they are taken to be the case (e.g. in argument B1 d p(d,s h)
holds). And with Assum 4 we have that if g holds as consequence of the ac-
tion this should be deemed unsafe. What can be done to attack an argument
instantiating scheme AS2 is an update to either C or A so that either of the
two relations does not hold ( | side effect(S) or | g). Since each fact in
C and each action in A has to be in CF and CA respectively, and CF and
CA do not allow for inconsistencies, any update on the local contexts has to be
truth preserving. Retracting or negating an element of CF or CA is done at the
Context Layer and the effect of such moves is discussed in §5.2.4. Since neither
R or A have an internal structure (we discuss relaxation of Assim 1 in §5.2.2),
truth preserving updates on C or A can only be done by adding a new set of
(relevant) facts R to C or complementary courses of actions Ac to A. There-
fore, what can be questioned on arguments instantiating scheme AS2 is whether
there exists a set R ⊆CF such that in the new context C ∪ R the side effect S
is no longer expected (AS2 CQ1); or in which the undesirable goal g would
not be realised (AS2 CQ2)17. Note that A only appears in the first assertion.
Thus, changes in A (A ∪ Ac) can only be proposed in order to argue that the
complementary course of action Ac can prevent the side effect S (AS2 CQ3).
These three critical questions have only practical use if the appropriate rele-
vant R or Ac are provided. The critical questions AS2 CQ1, AS2 CQ2 and
AS2 CQ3 are therefore addressed as attacking arguments respectively instan-
17That is, given the new context C ∪R the degree by which S realises g is too weak.
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tiating schemes AS3, AS4 and AS5, and so introducing the relevant Rs and Acs.
AS3
Preconditions: R ⊆ CF , S the side effect of the the target argument
C and A the updated context of facts and actions of the target argument.
Body:
In circumstances C




CQ1: Are circumstances such that an undesirable side effect will occur?
Context Updating Rule: C := C ∪R; A := A.
AS4
Preconditions: R ⊆ CF , S and g of the target argument replied to
C and A the updated context of facts and actions of the target argument.
Body:
In circumstances C
And assuming A will be performed




CQ1: Are circumstances such that the side effect will realise the
undesirable goal?
Context Updating Rule: C := C ∪R; A := A.
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AS5
Preconditions: Ac ⊆ CA, Rp ⊆ CF preconditions to perform Ac,
S of the target argument; C and A the updated context of facts and actions
of the replied argument.
Body:
In circumstances C ∪Rp
The complementary course of action Ac
Prevents actions A from causing the side effect S.
Ac ∧Rp|C∧A∧Γ side effect(S)
argue(C,A,preventive action(Ac,Rp,S));
Critical Questions:
CQ1: Are circumstances such that an undesirable side effect will be
achieved?
Context Updating Rule: C := C ∪Rp; A := A ∪Ac.
Figure 6 illustrates the use of these three argument schemes. Argument B2,
instantiating AS3, attacks B1, indicating that because the donor does not have
a Chronic Obstructive pulmonary disease (R = {d p(d,no copd)}) the donor’s
smoking history is no longer a contraindication. Argument C2, instantiating
AS4, attacks argument C1, indicating that because the potential recipient al-
ready has HIV (p r p(r,hiv)), the infection cannot be deemed as a severe
infection caused by the lung transplant18. Finally, argument D2 illustrates an
instantiation of scheme AS5 proposing to administrate penicillin to the recip-
ient (treat(r,penicillin)) of a lung of a donor whose cause of death was a
streptococcus viridans endocarditis (d p(d,sve)) so as to prevent an infection of
that same bacteria (r p(r,svi)). The set of preconditions Rp in argument D2
is empty.It is assumed in this scenario that there is an availability of penicillin
and means to administrate the antibiotic. Otherwise such facts should be added
in the set of preconditions.
Note that the attacks made on argument A by B1, C1 and D1 are asymmet-
ric (one way attacks), whereas the attacks on B1, C1 and D1 made respectively
by B2, C2 and D2 are symmetric. The reason for these differing attack rela-
tions is that in the former case, arguments in favour of the proposed action
are always based on an assumption that no contraindication exists; an assump-
tion that is undermined by the attacking arguments. (e.g., D1 undermines
A’s default assumption of no contraindication by identifying a contraindication
(d p(d, svi)). In the second case, complementary courses of actions are proposed
18Given that p r p(r,hiv), the degree by which side effect(r p(r,hiv)) realises a
sev inf(r) is too weak.
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AID Type Argument
AS1 argue({},{}, propose({av_org(d,lung), p_recip(r,lung)}, {transp(r,lung)}) )
B1 AS2
a) b)
argue(C,A, contra({d_p(d,s_h)}, {reject(r,lung)}, graft_failure) )
B2 AS3 argue(C,A, no_side_effect({¬d_p(d,copd)}, {reject(r,lung)}) )
C1 AS2 argue(C,A, contra({d_p(d,hiv)}, {r_p(r,hiv)}, sever_infect) )
C2 AS4 argue(C,A, not_realised_goal({p_r_p(r,hiv)}, {r_p(r,hiv)}, sever_infect) )
C3 AS6 argue(C,A, contra({r_p(r,superinf)}, sever_infect) )
D1 AS2 argue(C,A, contra({d_p(d,sve)}, {r_p(r,svi)}, sever_infect) )
D2 AS5 argue(C,A, preventive_action({treat(r,penicillin)}, {r_p(r,svi)}) )









Figure 6: Example of three lines of argumentation structured reasoning: the B
arguments which address the donor’s smoking history (d p(d,s h)), the C ar-
guments addressing the donor’s HIV (d p(d,hiv)); and the D arguments which
address the fact that the donor’s cause of death was streptococcus viridans en-
docrditis (d p(d,sve)) which may result in the recipient of the lung contracting
a streptococcus viridans infection (r p(r,svi)). Each argument’s C and A is
updated according to the schemes’ context updating rules.
to prevent undesirable side effects, where whether or not such prevention will
be realised may still be a matter of debate. Hence, D2 attacks D1 by proposing
treat(r, penicillin) to prevent reject(r, lung), where the efficacy of this preven-
tative measure may still be debatable (implicitly then, D2 and D1 disagree on
whether d p(d, svi) is or not a contraindication). This disagreement is made
explicit with a symmetric attack. To resolve whether the transplant is safe or
not will require a decision as to whether or not d p(d, svi) is a contraindication,
that is, whether D2 is preferred to D1 or vice versa (this is further discussed
in §7). Note however, that if a fourth argument D3 is submitted attacking ar-
gument D2, by indicating for instance that the potential recipient is allergic to
penicillin, such an attack will again be asymmetrically directed on an assump-
tion of argument D2 that no other contraindication exists. And so argument
D2 does not defend itself against (i.e attack) D3 as would be the case with a
symmetric attack.
Let us return to schemes AS3, AS4 and AS5 in order to identify their CQs.
An argument instantiating schemes AS3 or AS4 introduces a new set of relevant
facts R. An argument instantiating AS5 introduces a complementary course of
actions Ac with a possibly empty set of preconditions Rp. At this stage R, Rp
and Ac are taken to be the case (resp. intended), under assumptions Assum 2
and Assum 3a. As with arguments instantiating AS2, whether R and Ac are rel-
evant is decided first at the Proxy Level (e.g. should argument B2 be accepted,
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Figure 7: Argument Schemes connected via their associated Critical Questions
i.e., does {d p(d,no copd)}|C∧A∧Γ side effect({reject(r, lung)}) make
sense) and latter at the Resolution Stage (e.g. does argument B2 defeats argu-
ment B1, i.e., would {reject(r,lung)} be prevented).
An argument, say Arg, that instantiates scheme AS3, AS4 or AS5, assumes
(as in the case of the first submitted argument) that no (other) contraindica-
tion exists for performing the main action. This assumption is questioned by
AS3 CQ1, AS4 CQ1 and AS5 CQ1. As in AS1, such critical questions can
only be addressed as attacks identifying the contraindications and the associ-
ated undesirable side effects. Such attacks can thus be embodied by arguments
instantiating scheme scheme AS2, analogous to attacks on the first submitted
argument by arguments instantiating AS2. However, this time, as a way to
defend the main action’s safety, Arg introduces a new set of factors (facts or
actions) which themselves may warrant, respectively cause, some undesirable
side effect. That is, this time, an attack can be made via AS3 CQ1, AS4 CQ1
and AS5 CQ1 without having to introduce a new set of facts. Such attacks are
embodied by argument scheme AS6 which differs from AS2 in that it does not
require introducing an additional set of relevant facts R:
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AS6
Preconditions: S ⊆ S, non-empty and different from the replied
argument’s stated effect, g ∈ G;
C and A the updated context of facts and actions of the replied argument.
Body:
In circumstances C
The actions A will cause a side effect S
which will realise some undesirable goal g.
◦ |∼C∧A∧Γ side effect(S); and
◦ side effect(S) |∼C∧A∧Γ g;
argue(C,A,contra(S,g));
Critical Questions:
CQ1: Are circumstances such that the stated side effect will not be
achieved?
CQ2: Are circumstances such that the achieved side effect will not
realise the stated goal?
CQ3: Is there a complementary course of action that prevents the
achievement of the stated effect?
Context Updating Rule: C := C; A := A.
We can continue with our medical example to illustrate the use of schemes AS2
and AS6 in order to attack arguments instantiating schemes AS3, AS4 or AS5
(see fig. 6). Suppose, for instance, that the recipient to whom the lung is
intended is allergic to penicillin. Thus, if as a way to prevent the recipient’s
bacterial infection penicillin is administered (D2), the allergic reaction may be
quite severe, (anaphylaxis). Such an argument against the action’s safety is em-
bodied by D3 which instantiates scheme AS2. To illustrate the use of scheme
AS6, let us continue with the argumentation line A, C1 and C2, where it has
been argued that the lung may safely be transplanted despite the donor having
HIV because the potential recipient already has the same viral infection. It is
currently believed that in most cases such transplants will cause a superinfec-
tion[63], which is an uncontrolled, severe infection. Note that no new factors
were introduced in order to attack argument C2. Thus, such an attack can be
embodied by an argument C3 that instantiates AS6. In this basic circuit of
schemes and critical questions, AS6’s critical questions are the same as those
for AS2.
Figure 7 depicts the circuit of argument schemes connected via their asso-
ciated critical questions presented in this section. In the following subsections
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we relax some of the assumptions introduced in this subsection so as to address
required extensions to this basic circuit.
5.2.2 Accounting for Specificity
Let us suppose now that a DA offers for transplantation the lung of a donor with
a history of cancer (d p(d,h cancer)). The DA herself may argue that in such
history the recipient will result having as a side effect cancer. As depicted in
figure 8 this argument (E1) can be instantiated using scheme AS2. Let us sup-
pose as well that the DA have added to CF the fact d p(d,h nonmel skin c)
meaning that the donor had a nonmelanoma skin cancer. A history of cancer
is in general an excluding criteria for being a donor. However, for some kind
of past malignancies, such as nonmelanoma skin cancer, the risk of transmit-
ting the malignancy to the recipient is believed to be marginal [25]. Let us
suppose the RA believes that to be the case and would wish to argue that for
this particular type of cancer the transplant is safe. At first sight it may seem
that this argument could be constructed by instantiating scheme AS3 with R =
{d p(h nonmel skin c)} being the new relevant set of facts. And so updating
the local context of facts to be:
C = {av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung),d p(d,h cancer),
d p(d,h nonmel skin c)}
Although clearly C holds (C ⊆ CF ), there is a bit of information that despite
being important is not captured if AS3 is to be used. That is, d p(d,h cancer)
and d p(d,h nonmel skin c) are not independent facts, the latter is a subclass
of the former. Furthermore, there is an implicit assumption that donor had a
history nonmelanoma skin cancer and no other type of cancer.
In order to account for this we need first to relax Assum 1a by associating
to R a relation of specificity ≺ so as to account for the fact that, for instance,
{d p(d,h nonmel skin c)} ≺ {d p(d,h cancer)}.
Having defined a taxonomy in R the circuit of schemes and CQs is ex-
tended. The CQs of the kind – Are the current circumstances such that...? –
(i.e. AS2 CQ1, AS2 CQ2, AS3 CQ1, AS4 CQ1, AS5 CQ1, AS6 CQ1 and
AS6 CQ2) can now be embodied as an attack not only by schemes AS2, AS3
and AS4 but also by their specific versions AS2s, AS3s and AS4s. Below we
introduce only scheme AS3s, schemes AS2s and AS4s are defined analogously:
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AS3s
Preconditions: Rg ⊆ C, Rs ⊆CF , S of the replied argument
C and A the context of facts and actions of the replied argument.
Body:
Because Rs, a particular case of Rg, holds
in circumstances (C −Rg)
the side effect S is not expected as caused by A.
◦ Rs ≺ Rg
◦ Rs|(C−Rg)∧A∧Γ side effect(S)
argue(C,A,no side effect(replace s(Rg, Rs),S));
Critical Questions: Same as AS3
Context Updating Rule: C := (C −Rg) ∪Rs; A := A.
The main change in these new schemes is the way the local context of facts C
is updated. Instead of introducing an additional set of facts R (as it is the case
with AS2, AS3 and AS4) a subset Rg ⊆ C is replaced by a more specific set of
facts Rs (Rs ≺ Rg). In this way, it is made explicit that Rg does not holds by
itself, independent of Rs. Rather, Rg is the case only because Rs holds, since
Rs entails Rg. Thus, for example, d p(d,h cancer) would hold only because
d p(d,h nonmel skin c) is the case.
Figure 8: Example illustrating the use of argument scheme AS3s and of a chal-
lenge.
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To continue with our example, argument E1 can now be attacked by an
argument E2 instantiating scheme AS3s as follows:
E2: argue(
{av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung),d p(d,h cancer)},{transp(r,lung)},
no side effect(
replace s({d p(d,h cancer)}, {d p(d,h nonmel skin c)}),
{r p(r,cancer)}));
With its updated local context of facts being:
C = {av org(d,lung),p recip(r,lung),d p(d,h nonmel skin c)}
5.2.3 Accounting for Uncertainty
As argued in §4.2, while ProCLAIM does not support a dispute regarding
whether a fact in CF holds or not, it is still important for the decision making
to account for the evidence that supports facts asserted during the Argumen-
tation Layer. Thus participants should be able to request for and provide such
evidence. For example, the RA may want to know the evidence that supports
the fact that the donor has HIV.
To enable this Assum 1a has to be relaxed by associating to R a defeasible
consequence relation |∼ev where Ev|∼evFact indicates that a set of facts Ev ⊆ R
is evidence in support of the fact Fact ∈ R . For example {clin rec(d,hiv)}
|∼evd p(d,hiv) indicating that donor’s clinical records support the fact that
the donor has HIV.
Secondly, the circuit of schemes and CQs has to be extended so that argu-
ment schemes that introduce relevant set of facts R19, for each asserted fact
ri ∈ R, there is an associated CQ of the form – Is there evidence to believe ri is
the case? –. Now, this CQ is indeed intended to question ri so that participants
have to provide evidence in its support. However, it is not intended for partic-
ipants to argue that ri is false, for this should be resolved outside ProCLAIM.
Thus, such CQs are formalised only as challenge locutions:
challenge(evidence(ri))
Where in their replay is expected an argument that provides the evidence, a set
of facts (Ev ⊆ CF ), in support of ri (Ev|∼evri). So, a challenge directed on
argument C1 challenge(evidence(d p(d,hiv))) may be replied providing
the set of facts {clin rec(d,hiv)}.
The purpose of these CQs is to allow bringing in the evidence on which the
introduced facts are based. In so doing the inherent uncertainty of the facts
conforming to the circumstances in which the decision making takes place is
made explicit. In this way, decisions are made accounting for this uncertainty,
which may, of course, motivate further enquiries in order to make more informed
decisions. For example, doctors may proceed to perform a serological (blood)
19These are schemes AS2, AS2s, AS3, AS3s, AS4 and AS4s.
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test on the donor in order to have more conclusive evidence on whether the
donor does actually have HIV. However, while the results of any such enquiry
can be fed into ProCLAIM’s deliberation by updating CF , the actual enquiry
is not formalised by ProCLAIM.
As stated above these CQs are associated to any argument scheme that de-
fines the introduction of a new set of facts, i.e. to schemes AS2, AS2s, AS3,
AS3s, AS4 and AS4s. Here we present only scheme AS2ev which should be
instantiated to construct an argument in reply to a challenge made on an ar-
gument instantiating AS2 or AS2s. The other schemes (AS3ev linked to AS3
and AS3s and scheme AS4ev linked to AS4 and AS4s) are defined analogously:
AS2ev
Preconditions: ri the questioned fact, Rev ⊆ CF , S and g of the argument
being challenged, and C and A its updated context of facts and actions.
Body:
Rev is evidence for ri being the case, and such that
in circumstances (C − {ri}) ∪Rev
actions A will cause a side effect S
which will realise some undesirable goal g.
◦ Rev |∼ev ri
◦ Rev |∼(C −{ri})∧A∧Γ side effect(S); and
◦ side effect(S) |∼Rev∧Ci∧Γ g
argue(C,A,contra(replace ev(ri, Rev),S,g));
Critical Questions: Same as AS2 and AS2s to which we now add the CQs
CQ4i: Is there evidence to believe ri is the case? (ri ∈ R,
R the new introduced set of facts)
Context Updating Rule: C := (C − {ri}) ∪Rev; A := A.
Note that an argument instantiating scheme AS2ev not only provides the
evidence (Rev) supporting the challenged fact, but its claim is that if the asserted
fact is replaced by the evidence on which it is based on the same undesirable
side effects will be caused (see figure 8.). Analogously arguments instantiating
scheme AS3ev will claim that the side effect is not expected and; arguments
instantiating scheme AS4ev will claim that the side effect are not undesirable
in this updated circumstances.
The lack of evidence to support a challenged fact may motivate participants
to get that evidence within the deliberation (e.g. perform a serological test
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on the donor: test(d,blood,hiv)). However, it may well be the case that
such evidence cannot be acquired, so leaving a challenge weakly replied, or even
unreplied. This may lead PAs to retract the challenged fact and so subtract it
from CF , which brings us to the next extension to the circuit, accounting for
incomplete information.
Whether T is left with uncertain or unknown facts, decision makers will still
have to decide what to do. Having resolved which the preferred arguments are
in T, if the safety of the action amounts to deciding whether some uncertain
and/or unknown facts are the case or not, such resolution would plausibly aim
to assess the likelihood of these facts being the case, accounting for the risk
involved in them being or not the case. While ProCLAIM aims to identify
the relevant facts and the risk involved in them being or not the case, it is
not intended for addressing the resolution process of weighting likelihood versus
risk. This is further discussed in §7.
5.2.4 Accounting for Incomplete Information
Players may start the deliberation with a set of facts believed to be the case,
CF , and during the argumentation process realise that some potentially relevant
information, say r, is missing. That is, ¬r, r /∈ CF . But still, even if some
facts are unknown, a decision needs to be made on whether or not to perform
the proposed action. Decision makers should be made aware that potentially
relevant information is missing. To account for this situation, the argumentation
circuit is extended so that participants can submit arguments that introduce a
set of fact R as relevant, despite R *CF .20 That is, while it is argued that R is
relevant, it is unknown whether it holds or not. In that way, participants can
make explicit that some data, presumed to be relevant, is missing. And so, they
can submit hypothetical arguments. Arguments of the form –If R were the case,
then...–.
These hypothetical arguments are formalised in exactly the same manner
as those presented above, the only difference is that we now have relaxed the
precondition that facts used in an argument must be in CF . That is, we relax
the assumption Assum 2. In general, updates at the Argumentation Layer can
be made independently from to those at the Context Layer, and vice versa. This
independence results in the definition of three types of arguments:
Definition 5.3 Suppose C is the updated local context of facts of an argument
Arg, then:
• If C ⊆CF , Arg is a factual argument.
• If ∃r ∈ C s.t. ¬r ∈CF , Arg is a overruled argument.
• Otherwise, Arg is a hypothetical argument.
20Assuming, as we will later see, that R ∪ C 0Γ ⊥
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To illustrate a practical use of hypothetical arguments, let us introduce a new
organ acceptability criterion from [27]: “For pancreas transplantation, guidelines
suggest that donor age should be less than 45 yr; nonetheless, using pancreas
with good appearance on inspection after retrieval from donors aged 45-62 yr;
can achieve the same graft survival as pancreas from donors aged under 45
ys.”. Hence, if a donor is elderly (over 45 years, for the pancreas case) and her
pancreas is transplanted it is likely that it will be rejected, and so realising a
graft failure. Unless, the pancreas has good appearance. However, in order to
check the pancreas’ appearance, the organ must first be retrieved. Hence, the
transplant should have been deemed safe, at least provisionally.
Let us suppose that a pancreas of a 60 year old donor is available with the
donor having hcv. Suppose the DA offers the pancreas (argument A, see figure
9) and argues that: 1) because the donor is elderly, the recipient will reject
the organ (argument G1, instantiating scheme AS2), and 2) that the donor’s
hcv is a contraindication (argument H1, instantiating AS2), unless the recip-
ient already has this same infection (hypothetical argument H2, instantiating
AS4). Suppose that, in response to DA’s submitted arguments the RA adds
to CF the fact p r p(r,hcv) (the recipient has hcv) and so making argument
H2 factual. Also, let us suppose the RA submits the hypothetical argument G2
that instantiates AS3 as follows:
G2 = argue(C,A, no side effect({o p(d,pancreas, good app)},
{reject(r,pancreas)}) )
with o p(d,pancreas, good app) indicating that the donor’s pancreas has
good appearance. Argument G2 can only become factual once the organ is
retrieved. Taking this into account, and supposing arguments G2 and H2 are
deemed preferred to G1 and H1 respectively (fig. 9 c.), the pancreas will be
deemed suitable for this recipient, subject to the organ’s appearance on retrieval.
That is, if after retrieval o p(d,pancreas, good app) holds, the organ can be
transplanted, otherwise the transplant should not be performed, argument G2
would become overruled.
Note that, if the potential recipient does not have hcv (¬p r p(r,hcv) ∈CF ),
the transplant should be deemed unsafe, irrespective of the pancreas’ appear-
ance (fig. 9 d.). Or similarly, if H1 would have been submitted as a hypothetical
(it is unknown whether the donor has hcv or not) and H2 as factual, what be-
comes irrelevant, for deciding the action’s safety, is whether the donor has or
not hcv. Namely, hypothetical and factual arguments together indicate which
of the unknown facts are worth checking to see whether they hold.
The independence between the elements of CF and C makes each argument
potentially factual, overruled or hypothetical. To allow for such independence
we have relaxed the precondition that each additional set of facts R must be
in CF . Because we have defined CF such that it has to be a consistent set of
facts (CF0Γ ⊥) this precondition enforced that each argument’s context has to
be, in turn, consistent. To preserve such a property with the hypothetical argu-
ments, we must ensure that each additional set of facts R is consistent with the
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Figure 9: Example illustrating the use of hypothetical arguments.
elements of the argument’s local context C. To do so, to schemes AS2, AS2s,
AS2ev, AS3, AS3s, AS3ev, AS4, AS4s, AS4ev, we add the precondition:
The introduced set of relevant facts R must be such that R ∪ C 0Γ ⊥
5.2.5 Discussing Further Extension
There are a number of extensions that can be proposed to this circuit of schemes
and CQs. Any extension involves 1) identify the motivating set of examples
that needs to be addressed; 2) relax the appropriate assumptions and finally; 3)
define the procedure through schemes and CQs for capturing the right relation
among the sets R, A, S and G while appropriately updating the sets C and
A. Each such procedure, argument scheme, must be motivated by a change in
the assessment on the main action’s safety (within the local contexts of facts
an actions). In this subsection we describe a few extensions we are currently
formalising.
The first required extension is intended to allow PAs to point at actions that
are incompatible across different local contexts of actions. Take for example
two complementary actions Ac1 and Ac2 that are proposed each to mitigate
or prevent different side effects highlighted in a different branch of T. Each
action corresponds to a different local contexts: say < C1,A1 > and < C2,A2 >.
Suppose that Ac1 and Ac2 are such that when performed together they cause an
undesirable side effect. Firstly to address this example assumption Assum 3c
has to be relaxed, so that complementary actions can be deemed in conflict.
Secondly a procedure must be defined by which an undesirable side effect is
caused when the Ac1 and Ac2 are jointly performed. This suggest that the
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update of the local contexts < C1,A1 > and < C2,A2 > is for them to be merged
(i.e. < C1 ∪ Lfd2,A1 ∪ A2 >), capturing the fact that these local context are
no longer independent.
Another extension related with actions involves making a distinction between
intending and merely proposing/suggesting an action. For example, it may seam
reasonable that while a RA can argue that he intends to treat the recipient with
antibiotics to prevent a certain infection, the DA can only suggest treatments on
the recipient. This can be formalised in a similar fashion as we did in §5.2.4 to
address the problem of incomplete information. Relaxing Assum 3a, so that an
argument instantiating scheme AS5 can use complementary actions that are not
in CA, redefine the AS5’s preconditions and identifying which are the factual,
hypothetical and overruled arguments.
The last extension we discuss here is intended to allow addressing the fact
that in some circumstances any alternative to performing the main proposed
action will derive in more undesirable consequences than the side effects caused
by the proposed action. Thus, PAs should be able to question the degree of
undesirability of goals. Questioning, for example, whether cancer is undesir-
able enough as a side effect of a organ transplant when any alternative to the
organ transplant will result in the death of the potential recipient. To address
this example Assum 1d must be relaxed by associating to G a relation of un-
desirability, next Assum 4 needs to be relaxed so that not any realised g ∈ G
is reason enough so as to abort the proposed action. Finally the appropriate
procedure has to be defined.
6 Using the ASR to deliberate
Once the circuit of schemes and CQs is defined, and tailored to encode stereo-
typical reasoning patterns for deliberating over safety-critical actions, we can
further specialise this circuit to a particular application, e.g. the transplant or
environmental scenario.
To illustrate, let us consider the argument scheme AS1 in which, given the
preconditions Rp, an action Am is proposed. In the transplant scenario the pro-
posed action is always the same: transplant an organ, and the preconditions are:
to have an available organ for the potential recipient. Of course, in each instance
the donor, the recipient and the organ are different. Thus, tailoring AS1 to the
transplant scenario involves capturing this recurrent pattern while allowing for
different donor, organ and recipient instantiation. This can be done by un-
grounding the predicates av org(donor,organ),p recip(recipient,organ)
and transp(recipient,organ). So denoting variables with upper-case letters
we can define the tailored version of AS1 as:
AS1T : argue({},{},propose({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)},{transp(R,O)}))
The scenario-specific schemes and CQs are encoded in the ASR. The MA
references this repository in order to provide the legal replies to an argument.
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In so doing, ProCLAIM facilitates a highly focused deliberation, paramount for
its intended applications. This is not only because participants are directed
in their argument submission to a degree where they only need to fill in some
blanks (as in AS1T ), but also, in referencing the ASR theMA can easily identify
the arguments that though logically valid, make little sense in the application
scenario. Furthermore, the specialisation of the ASR plays an important role in
the CBRc retrieval process, helping identify potentially similar cases (broadly
speaking, cases in which the same reasoning patterns – specialised schemes –
were used), as discussed in §8.
6.1 Constructing an ASR
Given a new scenario application, one of the most important tasks when instan-
tiating the ProCLAIM framework, is the construction of the ASR, which defines
what is to be argued about and how. In this section we describe a procedure
for its construction, by way of illustrating with the transplant scenario.
Firstly, the ASR developers21 must identify the type of information to be
used in the deliberation. This information is encoded in the sets R, A, S and
G, which respectively denote the ungrounded versions of R, A, S and G. That
is, if for example, av org(d,lung) ∈ R then, av org(D,O) ∈ R. The next
step is to choose the (type of) safety-critical action to be argued about (e.g.
{transp(R,O)}⊆ A) and identify a set of preconditions required for the ac-
tion’s performance (e.g. {av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)}⊆ R). For each chosen
set of actions Ai ⊆ A and their set of preconditions Rp i ⊆ R developers can
define the specialised versions of AS1:
AS1i : argue({},{},propose(Rp i, Ai))
To each such AS1i there is associated the CQ AS1i CQ1: –Is there any con-
traindication for performing action Ai?–, which can be embodied as an attack
by a specialised version of AS2. Thus, given a specialisation of AS1 developers
must produce specialised versions of AS2. Any specialised version of AS2 that
replies to an argument instantiating AS1T is of the form:
AS2T : argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)},{transp(R,O)},contra(R,S,g))22
Now, for each undesirable goal that the action can bring about, (e.g. sev inf,
cancer, grft fail, death,...) there is a partially specialised version of AS2,
e.g.:
AS2T gf : argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)},{transp(R,O)},
contra(R,S,grft fail(R)))
21Most naturally, the construction of the ASR will be carried out mainly by computer
science developers under the supervision of domain experts.
22Note that R is a set of facts and R is a variable bounded by p recip(R,O) and transp(R,O).
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Developers must now identify the type of side effects S that realise each of
these undesirable goals, and in turn, identify which are the type of contraindica-
tions R that may lead the main action to cause these side effects. Thus, for ex-
ample, a graft failure occurs when a recipient rejects the organ ({reject(R,O)})
which may be because of a donor property ({d p(D,P)}, e.g. d p(d,s h)), due
to a blood mismatch (e.g. {blood(D,BtypeD), blood(R,BtypeR)}) or because
of a combination of the organ property and recipient property ({o p(O,Po),
p r p(R,Pr)} e.g. the lung is too big for the recipient’s thoracic cavity), etc.
Each of these combinations constitutes a specialised version of AS2:
AS2T gf1: argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)},{transp(R,O)},
contra({d p(D,P)},{reject(R,O)},grft fail(R)))
AS2T gf2: argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)},{transp(R,O)},
contra({blood(D,BtypeD), blood(R,BtypeR)},{reject(R,O)},grft fail(R)))
AS2T gf3: argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O)},{transp(R,O)},
contra({o p(O,Po),p r p(R,Pr)},{reject(R,O)},grft fail(R)))
Figure 10: ASR builder.
Now, to each such specialised schemes there are associated the CQs of the
scheme AS2, which should direct developers in further constructing the ASR.
For example, respectively embodying the Critical Questions AS2T gf1 CQ1,
AS2T gf1 CQ2 and AS2T gf1 CQ3 are the specialised schemes:
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AS3T gf1 1: argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O), d p(D,P)},{transp(R,O)},
no side effect({d p(D,P2)},{reject(R,O)}))
AS4T gf1 1: argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O), d p(D,P)},{transp(R,O)},
not realised goal({p r p(R,Pr)},{reject(R,O)},grft fail(R)))
AS5T gf1 1: argue({av org(D,O),p recip(R,O), d p(D,P)},{transp(R,O)},
preventive action({treat(R,T)},{},{reject(R,O)})))
The process continues in a similar way with each of these specialised schemes.
Developers are thus directed in the construction of the ASR by the circuit of
schemes and CQs described in §5. Furthermore, as described in §5, schemes are
also represented in natural language form, so that each specialised scheme will
have an associated natural language version e.g.:
AS5T gf1 1: The organ rejection can be prevented by treating the recipient with
T.
Figure 11: ASR Browser.
As noted earlier, the ASR construction is the key activity when instantiating
ProCLAIM for use in a given domain. It requires effort from both computer
science developers and domain experts, none of whom may be familiar with
argumentation. To facilitate their task we have developed two online tools
developed in PHP and MySQL: the first one intended to assist developers in the
the step by step ASR construction23 (see figure 10) and another tool24 which
allows domain experts to navigate the natural language forms of the ASR’s
schemes and CQ (see figure 11). These tools are currently in a prototype phase
of development and provides a useful proof of concept illustrating the potential
value of our approach.
We are currently also using these tools in application of ProCLAIM to the




decide whether an industrial wastewater can safely be discharged into a wastew-
ater treatment plant. Hence, for this case, the potentially relevant facts for
deciding the action safety include the industrial spill’s content, the treatment
plant’s conditions and characteristics as well as external factors such as weather
conditions. The undesirable side effects a spill may bring about relate to prob-
lems that can occur in the treatment plant, which in turn may cause ecological
imbalances in the fluvial ecosystem. The actions that may prevent or mitigate
such undesirable side effects include the use of different organic and chemical
products on the wastewater. These factors are combined following the proce-
dures introduced here, to build the ASR for the environmental scenario (see
[52]).
In this subsection we have illustrated how the full space of argumentation
can be codified in the ASR in a form useful for artificial and human agents.
In the following subsection we show how this effort enables a highly focused
deliberation process among heterogeneous agents.
6.2 MA’s guiding task
The deliberation begins with an argument proposing the main action, through
instantiation of a specialised version of AS1 in the ASR. The basic idea is that
an action (e.g. {transp(R,O)}) can only be proposed if the precondition (e.g.
{av org(D,O),
p recip(R,O)}) are met. In the transplant scenario, as soon as there is an avail-
able organ (e.g. kidney) of a donor (e.g. d) for a potential recipient (e.g. r)




The DA that offers the organ and the RA responsible for the potential recipient
may then enter the dialogue, first submitting a request:
request(da id,ma,conv id,1,0,enter dialogue(proposal,DA, d basic info))
request(ra id,ma,conv id,2,0,enter dialogue(proposal,RA, d basic info))
which, if accepted by theMA are replied to with an inform message broadcasted
to all participants:
inform(ma,all, conv id,3,1,
entered dialogue(proposal,da,d basic info,{ma},CF∧A,T, legal replies))
inform(ma,all, conv id,4,2,
entered dialogue(proposal,ra,r basic info,{ma,da},CF∧A,T,legal replies))
Where, for example: d basic info = {d p(d,sve), d p(d,young), loctn(d,hosp1),
blood(d,ab+)...}; and r basic info={loctn(r,hosp2),blood(r,ab+)...}.
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With these two messages CF is updated to contain d basic info and
r basic info. CA contains only action transp(r,kidney) and T contains only
the initial proposal, say A1.
Note that in these broadcasted messages the MA already informs the par-
ticipants of the possible lines of attack on each argument in T. In this example
these are the replies to argument A1. Among these legal replies are the spe-
cialised schemes:
AS2T inf1: argue(C,A, contra({d p(d,Pd)},{r p(r,Pr)},sev inf(r)))
AS2T gf3: argue(C,A, contra({o p(lung,Po),p r p(r,Pr)},
{reject(r,lung)},grft fail(r)))
AS2T cncr3: argue(C,A, contra({o p(lung,Po)},{r p(r,cancer)},
cancer(r)))
where C = {av org(d,kidney),p recip(r,kidney)} and A =
{transp(r,kidney)}.
Hence, if RA were to argue that the donor’s sve25 may cause a streptococcus
viridans infection (svi) in the recipient, RA would select scheme AS2T inf1
among the legal replies and would require only to replace Pd with sve and Pr
with svi in order to construct the desired argument.
request(ra id,ma,conv id,5,4,
argue(argue(C,A, contra({d p(d,sve)},{r p(r,svi)},sev inf(r)))).
If the argument is accepted the MA will broadcast the submitted argument
providing the participants a list of legal replies such as:
AS3T inf1: argue(C,A, no side effect({d p(d,Pd)},{r p(r,svi)}))
AS4T inf1: argue(C,A, not realised goal({p r p(d,Pd)},{r p(r,svi)},
sev inf(r)))
AS5T inf1: argue(C,A, preventive action({treat(r,T)},{},{r p(r,svi)})
AS2 inf1 CQ41: challenge(d p(d,sve))
Where C = {av org(d,kidney),p recip(r,kidney),d p(d,sve)}
Thus, with each new argument or challenge added to T, MA provides the
participants with challenges ready to be submitted and tailored schemes that
are partially instantiated and require only to be filled in. For example, scheme
AS5T inf1 requires only to identify an action T (e.g. penicillin or teicoplanine)
that would prevent a recipient infection. While scheme AS3T inf1 guides par-
ticipants to consider whether the donor has any property Pd which would make
the transplant safe in spite of having d p(d,sve)26.
25Note that d p(d,sve)∈CF .
26To our knowledge, no such property is known. Nonetheless, there may be in the future.
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Figure 12: The argument editor of the application presented in [53]. This panel
provides a human user with a legal reply (AS5T inf1) to an argument. The
Inference Engine button will validate the argument according to the knowledge
base of an artificial agent that aids the user in the deliberation. The Next button
provides the user with another legal reply (another scheme, e.g. AS4T inf1) and
button Suggestion proposes a scheme instantiation suggested by the artificial
agent’s knowledge base.
As noted above in §6.1, the ASR encodes each scheme in a ‘code’ format
useful for artificial agents and a natural language representation form for hu-
man users. In general an application instantiating ProCLAIM can feature a
number of visualisation modes. For example, the content of the deliberation
can be displayed as a tree of interacting nodes, where nodes are labelled with
the relevant facts or actions the arguments highlight. Upon clicking on a node,
its full natural language representation can be displayed, as well as legal replies
presented as natural language templates for instantiation by the user. In [53],
an artificial agent guided users in the argument submission and possible scheme
instantiations (see fig.12), and validated alternative instantiations proposed by
users. The user ultimately decided the argument to submit, and engaged in
deliberation with an artificial agent that interacted solely with the schemes’ for-
matted in Prolog code. This Application was implemented using two software
components developed in the FP6 European project ASPIC27: an Argumenta-
tion Engine used for the agents’ reasoning and a Dialogue Manager which with
some extensions acted as the MA. The application was mainly implemented
in Java, using Jade28 for the agents’ implementation and the Argumentation
Engine was partially implemented in Java and prolog (see [53]) .
Having submitted the arguments, PAs may submit the no more moves()
move. If all PAs do so, or the MA submits the time out(reason) locution,
then the Resolution Stage is initiated and the MA may proceed to evaluate T.
7 Argument Evaluation
In the Resolution Stage, the MA has to evaluate the status of arguments in




defensible, defeated and justified arguments in T. If the argument at the root of
T is evaluated to be justified, the action is deemed safe, whereas if defeated, then
the lines of arguments that lead to the rejection, identify the contraindications
that warrant deeming the action as unsafe.
Prior to computing the arguments’ status MA has to: 1) reference the
DCK and the CBRc as these component may submit additional arguments; 2)
assign a preference relation between arguments that mutually attack each other,
since symmetric attacks may prevent a definitive status evaluation of the main
proposed argument; and finally 3) appropriately deal with arguments that are
hypothetical or that are not well defended from a challenge made on them.
As discussed in §2, MA may submit additional arguments by referencing
both the DCK and the CBRc. The first knowledge resource will help identify
any fact in CF or alternative complementary course of action in A that though
relevant for the decision making, according to domain consented knowledge,
was not taken into account by the PAs. These relevant factors are added to
T by means of submitting an argument that instantiates the appropriate legal
reply. The second knowledge resource will propose for submission arguments
that have been submitted in previous similar cases but are not in the current
T(see §8). Thus, in this task, the MA plays the role of two additional PAs:
an expert or specialist in domain consented knowledge, and another specialist
in reusing evidence collected from past deliberations. Consider for instance the
argumentation line A, D1, D2 and D3 in §5.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 13c,
where, in order to prevent a streptococcus infection on the recipient (argument
D1) PA proposed administrating the patient penicillin (D2). However, the
patient was allergic to penicillin (D3). The MA can use DCK or CBRc to
suggest an alternative antibiotic (e.g. teicoplanine) for preventing the infection
on the recipient. This can be posed as an argument (D4 in fig. 13) instantiating
scheme AS5T inf1.
In the same way as regular PAs can endorse which arguments they support
at the Endorsement Layer, the DCK and CBRc can assign a preference relation
between mutually attacking arguments. This is the second task of the MA.
Let us suppose, for now, that T contains no hypothetical arguments and all
challenges are successfully replied to. The problem with symmetric attacks is
that they may prevent evaluating the root argument’s main action proposal as
either justified or defeated (that is, it may be defensible). To solve this impasse
a preference relation is assigned between mutually attacking arguments so as
to decide which asymmetrically attacks the other. Consider the argumentation
framework with arguments A, B1 and B2 in §5.2.1, where the debate is whether
an available lung is viable when the donor has a smoking history but no COPD
(see fig. 13a.). In this example deciding whether the transplant is safe or not
amounts to deciding whether argument B1 is preferred to B2 (and so asym-
metrically attacks B2) or B2 is preferred to B1 (and so asymmetrically attacks
B1). In the first case the root argument would be rejected under the grounded
semantics, and so the transplant would be deemed unsafe (a graft failure is
expected because of the donor’s smoking history, even though the donor has
no COPD). In the later case the root argument would be justified under the
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grounded semantics, and so the transplant deemed safe because it is believed
that if {d p(d,no copd)} holds {d p(d,s h)} is not a contraindication.
The preference relation between mutually attacking arguments is deter-
mined by ProCLAIM’s three knowledge resources DCK, CBRc and AEM. Each
knowledge resource will provide its own perspective on the arguments’ relative
strength. The DCK will derive the preference assignment from the standard
guidelines and regulations of the domain (e.g. donor and organ acceptability
criteria). For instance, if a lung of a donor with a smoking history but no
COPD is deemed viable for transplantation according to current agreed-upon
transplant guidelines the DCK will deem B2 preferred to B1. The CBRc will de-
rive its assignment from previous similar cases. Broadly speaking, if arguments
similar to B2 have been successfully deemed preferred to arguments similar to
B1 in previous similar cases the CBRc will also deem B2 as preferred to B1 (as
discussed in §8). Finally the AEM takes the PAs’ endorsement moves (those in
E) and assigns weights based on a measurement of trust specific to the applica-
tion scenario (e.g. based on the role of the PAs or the prestige of the transplant
unit the PAs represent). Thus, if more trusted agents have endorsed B2 rather
than B1, the AEM will deem B2 as preferred to B1.
In this simple example, B2 is deemed preferred to B1 and the MA may
broadcast a solution of the kind: –the transplant is safe–. However, not only
may different knowledge resources yield conflicting preferences (DCK may deem
B1 as preferred to B2 while the CBRc may deem the opposite), but their
preference assignments may vary in degrees of confidence. Furthermore: novel
proposals from PAs may lead to situations about which the DCK has little
knowledge; depending on the case the CBRc may have more or less evidence to
prefer one argument over another; and finally, equally trustful PAs may each
endorse a competing argument preventing the AEM from deeming one argument
as stronger than the other.
To address these issues, we maintain the independence of the preference
assignments so that the final decision makers have an account of the different
perspectives’ recommendations. Let us then define the preference assignment
as a mapping:
pref : A×A 7→ [−1, 1]× [−1, 1]× [−1, 1]
Thus, pref(A1,A2) = (a, b, c), where a is the preference assignment of the DCK,
b of the CBRc and c of the AEM, and where positive values express a preference
for the first argument over the later (A1 preferred to A2) and negative values
the opposite. Zero means there is no preference at all. The bigger the absolute
value of the number, the more the confidence in the preference assignment.
Thus if pref(A1,A2) = (−1,−1,−1) then A2 is deemed preferred to A1 with
full confidence. When the preference assignments are not all in agreement, say
for instance pref(A1,A2) = (0.2,−0.6,−0.5), then decision makers must decide
whether or not to override guidelines (A1 preferred to A2 with confidence 0.2),
and trust the PA’s assessment knowing that he is a reliable expert (A2 preferred
to A1 with confidence 0.5) and his opinion is backed by evidence (A2 preferred
55
to A1 with confidence 0.6). Of course symmetric attacks are only important
to resolve when they preclude definitive evaluation of the status of the root
argument proposing the main action. For example, in figure 13c. determining
the direction of an asymmetric attack (based on a preference) between D1 and




argue({},{}, propose({av_org(d,lung), p_recip(r,lung)}, {transp(r,lung)}) )
B1
b)
argue(C,A, contra({d_p(d,s_h)}, {reject(r,lung)}, graft_failure) )
B2 argue(C,A, no_side_effect({¬d_p(d,copd)}, {reject(r,lung)}) )
H1 argue(C,A, contra({d_p(d,hcv)}, {r_p(r,hcv)}, sever_infect) )
H2 argue(C,A, not_realised_goal({p_r_p(r,hcv)}, {r_p(r,hcv)}, sever_infect) )
H3 challenge(evidence(d_p(d,hcv)) )
D1 argue(C,A, contra({d_p(d,sve)}, {r_p(r,svi)}, sever_infect) )
D2 argue(C,A, preventive_action({treat(r,penicillin)}, {r_p(r,svi)}) )
























D4 argue(C,A, preventive_action({treat(r,teicoplanin)}, {r_p(r,svi)}) )
Figure 13: Argument tree evaluation
We now address the MA’s third evaluative task which involves accounting
for hypothetical arguments and challenges that are either weakly replied or even
unreplied. As discussed both in §5.2.3 and §5.2.4, the purpose of ProCLAIM’s
deliberation is not to decide whether or not uncertain or unknown facts are the
case, but whether these are relevant for the actions’ safety, and if so, what is
the risk involved in these facts being or not the case. The risk involved in a fact
being or not being the case is highlighted by the arguments when indicating
what undesirable side effects may or may not be expected, so let us discus now
how ProCLAIM identify the uncertain or unknown facts that decision makers
should be ware of.
Once the preference assignment process has taken place, where hypothetical
arguments and weakly replied challenges are taken as regular elements of T, the
following labelling process takes place:
• Arguments whose updated local context of facts contain an unknown fact,
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f (i.e. f,¬f /∈CF ) are labelled as f -unknown;
• Arguments whose updated local context of facts contain an uncertain fact
f , i.e. while f ∈CF , f has been challenged but not well defended. These
arguments are labelled f -uncertain;
• Arguments and challenges which acceptability status (defeated or justi-
fied) depends on arguments labelled either as f-unknown or f -uncertain
are labelled as f -dependent.
Let us continue with arguments A, B1 and B2, supposing argument B2
has been deemed preferred to B1 and that fact d p(d,no copd) is unknown,
and so B2 is d p(d,no copd)-unknown and both arguments A and B1 are
d p(d,no copd)-dependent. This is because, if d p(d,no copd) is taken to be
the case, B1 becomes defeated and A justified, whereas if it is taken to be false,
B2 would be overruled, and so B1 would be justified and A defeated. Namely,
both A and B1’s acceptability status depends on d p(d,no copd).
Note that in this example, a decision on whether or not to transplant the
lung must first address the problem of not knowing whether d p(d,no copd) is
or is not the case. This is because argument A is d p(d,no copd)-dependent.
In figure 13b argument B1 is attacked and defeated by an argument Arg1. In
this case, whether d p(d,no copd) holds or not, argument A will be justified.
In general, only when the argument proposing the main action is labelled as
f -dependent for some fact f , that the uncertainty of the fact f has to be ad-
dressed by decision makers, since only in this case that the final decision actually
depends on whether or not f is believed to be the case.
Figure 13c. illustrates what could be a proposed solution to a delibera-
tion. Rather than providing a safe/unsafe solution MA returns a new version
of T with 1) possibly new arguments (e.g. D4), 2) where mutual attack are
resolved into one way attacks when there is enough confidence to do so (e.g. B2
preferred to B1, H1 preferred to H1) and when there is not enough confidence,
decision makers are given the actual values of the preference assignment so they
can ultimately decide which arguments to prefer (e.g. pref(D1, D2) = (-0.1,-
0.4,-0.5) and pref(D1, D4) = (0,-0.6,0) ). And finally 3) the main proposed
argument is labelled with the facts that need to be resolved in order to decide
upon the main action’s safety (e.g. argument A is d p(d,no copd)-dependent).
In the example depicted in figure 13c the transplant will be deemed safe if de-
cision makers believe d p(d,no copd) to be the case and rely on teicoplanin
to prevent the recipient’s infection. If the timeout locution has not been trig-
gered yet, before a decision is taken, this new version of T is returned to the
PAs who may accept the solution submitting the locution accept(sol id) or
they may continue adding information, e.g. endorsing argument D4 or sub-
mitting a further argument D5 indicating that the recipient is also allergic to
teicoplanin. In the latter case, PAs will have to inform when they have no addi-
tional moves or the timeout is triggered for theMA to compute the new solution.
When participants submitted the accept(sol id) locution or the timeout has
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been triggered, the deliberation concludes with the submission of the locution
close deliberation(solution,sol id) with the last given solution.
8 Using the Tree of Arguments as Evidence
Once a deliberation has concluded, the tree of arguments T contains all the facts
and actions deemed relevant for assessing the main proposed action’s safety,
from the view point of domain experts, guidelines, regulations and past collected
evidence. If the main action is deemed safe and eventually performed, T can
then be updated by the appropriate PAs so as to record the actual outcome of
the action’s performance. For instance, if the recipient of a lung of a donor with
smoking history and no COPD rejects the transplanted organ, the RA updates
T so that B1 is preferred to B2 (e.g. change in Figure 13 the attack relation
between B1 and B2 so that B1 asymmetrically attacks B2).Note that after this
update the arguments in T are no longer presumptive but explanatory in nature.
They describe the actual outcome of the performed action. And so, the updated
T can be reused as evidence for resolving future similar deliberations, which is
the CBRc’s role.
In this section we only outline how the circuit of argument schemes defined
here facilitate the reuse of the evidence encoded in previous deliberations. We
refer the reader to [57] for a more comprehensive description of how the four
reasoning cycles – Retrieve, Revise, Reuse and Retain [1]– are implemented.
There are two aspects of the schemes defined here that further facilitate
the CBRc task: 1) the specificity of the schemes in the ASR (as described
in §6) and 2) that relevant facts and complementary courses of actions are
introduced in a structured fashion, each singled out and introduced step by
step. The schemes’ specificity allows identifying potentially similar cases with
little computational cost. The idea is that cases in which the same specialised
schemes (reasoning patterns) were used, may be similar. Thus, by organising
the case-base in terms of the argument schemes, a set of broadly similar cases
can effectively be retrieved. The latter aspect of the schemes facilitates a more
detailed comparison between cases on the basis of the similarity between the
cases’ introduced relevant facts and actions. We illustrate with a simple example
from the medical scenario.
Suppose the deliberation consisted only of the arguments A, D1 and D2,
where a lung of a donor whose cause of death was streptococcus viridans en-
docarditis (d p(d,sve)) is offered for transplantation, and the donor’s sve is
believed to be a contraindication (D1) because the recipient may be infected
by this bacteria. Argument D2 indicates that the infection can be prevented
by administrating penicillin to the recipient. Arguments A, D1 and D2 respec-
tively instantiate schemes AS1T , AS2T inf1 and AS5T inf1 (see §6.2) encoding
the following reasoning pattern:
–An organ O was intended for transplantation. The donor had some condi-
tion P which would bring about a severe infection in the recipient. Treatment
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T for the recipient was proposed to prevent this infection–
Thus by retrieving from the case-base all the deliberations which consisted
of these three schemes we obtain cases that are already quite similar to our
target case. So now, if we take from these past cases those where the organ O is
a lung, the condition P is similar to sve (e.g. streptococcus bovis endocarditis)
and where the treatment T is similar to penicillin, we obtain the desired set
of cases from which to evaluate the target case on an evidential basis. Thus,
while the argument schemes are used as a heuristics for a first, broad case
retrieval, the similarity between cases is ultimately derived from a similarity
between the facts and actions highlighted as relevant for the decision making.
The similarity between facts and between actions can be derived from a distance
measure between terms in an ontology. So, for instance, if the distance in a
medical ontology between the terms penicillin and teicoplanin is below a
given threshold, it can be derived that treatments with these two antibiotics are
similar. And thus, if two arguments instantiate the same scheme of the ASR,
and the used terms for their instantiation are similar, we can then say that these
two arguments are similar (see [57] for more detail).29
Having retrieved the set of similar cases, represented by argument trees, the
CBRc can derive its preference assignment on mutually attacking arguments.
The retrieved Ts represent cases where the action was already performed, and
thus it only contains asymmetric attacks. In our example this results in two
types of retrieved argument trees: T+, where the arguments similar to D2
asymmetrically attacks and so defeat those similar to D1, i.e. the action was
successful; and T-, where the arguments similar to D1 defeat those similar to
D2, i.e. the treatment did not prevent the recipient’s infection. If the incidence
of T+ cases significantly outnumber the T- cases then argument D2 would
be deemed preferred to D1, otherwise either argument D1 would be deemed
preferred to D2 or, if there is not enough evidence so as to prefer one argument
over the other, their conflict will remain unresolved.
Once the target T has been accordingly edited by all the ProCLAIM’s knowl-
edge resources, if the final evaluation indicates that the action is safe, the target
case will be retained in the case-base to be reused as evidence in future similar
cases. This is described in more detail in [57].
9 Conclusions, Future and Related Work
In this paper we have presented an argumentation-based model –ProCLAIM–
for deliberating over safety-critical actions. The model aims to provide a setting
for an effective and efficient deliberation: by 1) facilitating participation and
29Other works (e.g [37]) address issues such as the equivalence between argumentation
frameworks (where frameworks are equivalent if they show same results under different se-
mantics). The CBRc uses the T associated to each case only as a heuristic to identify the
similar cases, where their similarity is determined by the similarity in the facts highlighted as
relevant. In other words, the retrieved T ’s may not be equivalent as argumentation frame-
works.
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exchange of arguments among heterogeneous agents and 2) focusing the deliber-
ation on the relevant matters to be discussed. Central to the realisation of these
key features is the use of Argument Schemes and Critical Questions. In §5 we
defined a circuit of schemes and CQs that defines a protocol-based exchange of
arguments, specialised for deliberating over safety critical actions. In §6 we have
illustrated how this circuit can be further specialised for a particular scenario
and how these scenario-specific schemes facilitate the argument construction for
both human and artificial agents. In particular we have illustrated how, directed
by a mediator agent, and with the use of the dialogue game introduced in §4,
participants are guided at each stage of the deliberation on what can be argued
about and how. In this way, the deliberation can effectively be modelled as an
argumentative process for eliciting knowledge from the participants.
The primary contribution of ProCLAIM is that it enables the automation of
deliberation dialogues between agents (human or software) over organ transplant
decisions (or environmental decisions see [52]), in a manner which is structured
and orderly, and which elicits all the information needed to make such decisions
jointly and rationally, even when this information is possessed only by some
of the participating agents. A secondary contribution is that these dialogues
do not require the participants to have specialised knowledge of argumentation
theory, because the framework embeds medical domain expertise in a natural
way using scenario-specific argumentation schemes.
Over the last years a growing number of proposals appeal to the use of
argument schemes for argumentation-based dialogues [42, 38, 47, 21, 5, 10].
These works generally assume the schemes proposed by Walton [60] or that
proposed by Atkinson et al. [4]. While these schemes are undoubtedly of great
value, we believe they are too abstract for many real life applications. The
possibility to cover any possible line of reasoning is of course appealing, and
may be required in some circumstances (e.g. in legal applications [22, 6, 62]
or in e-democracy [21, 12]). However, other decision-making application can
benefit from narrowing down the lines of reasoning to only what is essential to
the problem at hand, thus making a better use of the decision making context.
The specialised schemes and CQ not only reduce the computational cost for
the reasoners but they also focus the dialogue on what is essential, increasing
the chances for a successful deliberation process. To the best of our knowledge
we know of no other work that have proposed and explored the added value of
scenario-specific schemes and CQs.
One of the main contributions of our work is in showing that the provision
of the scenario specific schemes and CQs can facilitate relatively sophisticated
deliberations in sensitive domains such as human organ transplantation or in-
dustrial wastewater management [52], while reducing the complexity of argu-
ment construction to filling in simple templates (as shown in §6.2). While the
main focus of our work has been on facilitating the agents’ exchange of argu-
ments, another contribution is ProCLAIM ’s approach to argument validation
and evaluation. The former is required to flexibly prevent spurious arguments
from disrupting the deliberation. The latter is required to provide decision
support as to whether the proposed action is safe or not, and is achieved by
60
incorporating the relevant facts and actions into a tree of arguments that is
evaluated on the basis of guidelines and regulations, expert opinion and past
collected evidence. When all knowledge resources are in agreement, and the
action’s safety does not depend on the uncertainty of any fact, the proposed
solution provides the reasons to deem the action safe or unsafe. Otherwise, the
proposed solution highlights the relevant issues that must be resolved.
Taken together, the above contributions provide foundations for the practi-
cal realisation of deliberations involving artificial and human agents30. We thus
believe ProCLAIM helps bridge the gap between theoretical models of argumen-
tation for agent systems (as embodied by works such as [4]) and their practical
realisation.
Other contributions of this paper include ProCLAIM ’s decoupling of the res-
olution of what is the case and the deliberation over the actions’ safety. Firstly,
this gives priority to the main question:–Is the action safe in current circum-
stances? -so that, for example, questioning the current circumstances (i.e. the
facts in CF ) is licensed only if this challenges the action’s safety (at least in a
local context). Secondly it allows one to address, in a relatively simple fashion,
problems such as incomplete or uncertain information, at the time of construct-
ing the arguments, when updating the new available information and when
evaluating the arguments.Another contribution is the way in which the relevant
facts and actions are explicitly singled out in the argument construction. This,
together with the Argument Scheme Repository, is of great importance for the
CBRc task of reusing past deliberations as evidence.
It is worth recalling at this point that ProCLAIM is intended for regulated
environments where PAs (human or artificial) are expected to be fully coop-
erative domain experts. We also assume a shared agreement on the rules and
purpose of the deliberation. In particular we assume the proposed action to
be desirable in default circumstances and while there may be disagreement on
which circumstances the action can safely be performed, there is an agreement
on which side effects, if believed to be caused, will be sufficiently undesirable
so as to prevent performing the proposed action as deemed unsafe (e.g. cancer,
graft failure or death of the recipient of an organ). In particular, PAs individual
goals and values are not part of the argumentation.31
While we believe to have made important progress in the development of
the reasoning patterns for deliberating over safety critical actions, we do make
a number of assumptions that should be addressed in future works. Most no-
tably are the assumptions that there is no preference between undesirable goals
and that complementary proposed actions are compatible. The former disables
the possibility to argue in favour of an action that although may cause an un-
desirable side effect (e.g. cancer to the recipient) any alternative will result in
a worse outcome (e.g. death of the recipient). The later assumption disregards
30as illustrated by [53]’s implementation of a prototype that uses schemes and CQs similar
to those described in this paper to facilitate the deliberation between a human and an artificial
agent on the viability of a human organ for transplantation
31They may influence which arguments they submit and endorse, but they do not constitute
a reason within ProCLAIM’s deliberation to deem the action as safe or not.
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the possibility of two courses of actions causing an undesirable side effect if
jointly performed. We briefly discus these limitations in §5.2.5. In future work
we should also add more expressivity to the action dimension A so as to at
least incorporate a notion of order in which actions should be performed.
In ProCLAIM’s definition we make an assumption that PAs would not dis-
pute each others’ description of the state of affairs. The rationale for this as-
sumptions lies on the intuition that each PA provides information on that she
has a privileged access. So, while a DA has a privileged access to the infor-
mation about the donor, the RA does so of the recipient. Similarly in the
environmental scenario, an agent representing an infrastructure would not be
disputed over the information she gives about that infrastructure. This assump-
tion then motivates limiting the possibility of arguing strictly about what is the
case to allowing to request evidence in support of an asserted f ∈CF . This in-
tuition should further be developed and explicitly integrated into ProCLAIM’s
definition. Note however, that because we decouple the deliberation into T and
CF , a conflict resolution procedure to decide what is the case can easily be
plugged into ProCLAIM which outcome will update the set of facts CF which
in turn may affect T’s arguments shifting their type from factual, hypothetical
or overruled. Nonetheless, we will also investigate generalising CF to include,
for example, rules as well as facts. More involved techniques for belief revision
and contraction will then be required (recall that currently we assume only the
negation and retraction of facts in CF .
Future work will also address reformulating the Case-Based reasoning cycle
presented in [57] in order to accommodate the formalisation of the Argument
Schemes and Critical Questions in this paper. Another important requirement
for the implementation of ProCLAIM in realistic situations is to expand the
corpus of schemes and CQs for the transplant and the environmental scenario
ASRs. Also important is to perform more rigourous evaluation of the scope and
limitations of the elaborated schemes. Another requirement for future work
is to better formalise the dialogue game presented in §4.2 in order to further
facilitate its implementation, in particular we intend to describe its axiomatic
semantics, that is defining the pre and post conditions for each dialogue move.
With regard to related work, there are a number of works (e.g. [26], [11])
proposing deliberation, persuasion or negotiation models of argumentation for
agent systems32. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these works
address the more practical aspects that enable actual implementation of the
proposed models in scenarios more elaborated than simple illustrative examples.
There are also a number of works applying multi-agent systems to safety critical
domains; particularly the medical (see [24]) and the environmental domains (see
[15]). The most relevant that we are aware of is [35], in which a specific logic for
argumentation is proposed for aiding medical doctors in their decision making
in a multi-agent setting. However this work is primarily conceptual and does
not address the agents’ dialogical interaction or the roles of schemes and criti-
32See proceedings of the Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems (ArgMAS) Workshop Se-
ries (http://www.mit.edu/∼irahwan/argmas/).
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cal questions in guiding argument construction. Other works, such as [45] and
[20] are related in the sense that a repository of Argument Schemes and Critical
Questions play a central role. The former is intended to assist users in argument
diagramming, and the latter is intended to help (human) users construct a wide
variety of arguments, improving their ability to protect their interests in (poten-
tial) dialogues, especially in the legal domain. Another interesting approach is
taken in the Magtalo system[46], in which a repository of fully instantiated ar-
guments is used to help users express their position regarding a subject of public
debate. The user can direct a dialogue among different artificial agent which
allows them to explore the system’s knowledge base following the natural flow
of a dialogue. The user may then agree with the different exposed arguments,
may select an argument directly from the argument store and as a last resource,
type her own arguments in natural language (with no additional support). This
interaction is presented as non intrusive mode for eliciting knowledge from users.
This claim is based on what is termed the maieutic function of dialogue [61],
i.e. because users are immerse in a dialogue they do not feel that they are being
interrogated. In that sense we believe to go beyond this meiautic function by
not only placing importance on the underlying structure of arguments (noted in
[9] to be of value for this purpose) but by exploiting the context of application
so that: 1) PAs need not be concerned about the argument construction, but
only in filling in the blanks of templates presented in their domain expertise
jargon; and 2) the elicited knowledge is readily available for computational use,
as opposed to embedded in a free text paragraph.
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